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Abstract 
Nico Keilman, Dinh Quang Pham, Arve Hetland 
Norway’s Uncertain Demographic Future 
 
Social and Economic Studies 105 • Statistics Norway 2001 
The demographic future of any population is uncertain, but some of the many 
possible trajectories are more probable than others. Therefore, an exploration of 
the demographic future should include two elements: a range of possible 
outcomes, and a probability attached to that range. Together, these two constitute 
a prediction interval for the population variable concerned. This report presents the 
findings of a research project, the aim of which was to compute prediction 
intervals for the future population of Norway broken down by age and sex to the 
horizon 2050. 
 
We estimate that the odds are four against one (80 per cent chance) that Norway’s 
population, now 4.5 million, will number between 4.3 and 5.4 million in the year 
2025, and 3.7-6.4 million in 2050. This illustrates that uncertainty increases with 
time. There is a clear trade-off between greater accuracy (higher odds) and higher 
precision (narrower intervals). Odds of 19 against one (95 per cent chance) result in 
a wider interval: 4.1-5.7 million in 2025, and 3.2-7.3 million in 2050. The 
probabilistic population forecasts of the youngest and the oldest age groups show 
largest uncertainty, because fertility and mortality are hard to predict. As a result, 
prediction intervals in 2030 for the population younger than 20 years are so wide, 
that the forecast is not very informative. International migration shows large 
prediction intervals around expected levels, but its impact on the age structure is 
modest. In 2050, uncertainty has cumulated so strongly, that intervals are very 
large for virtually all age groups, in particular when the intervals are judged in a 
relative sense (compared to the median forecast). According to our statistical 
model, the expected accuracy of the total population size forecast published by 
Statistics Norway is somewhat below two-thirds on the long run, and a little above 
that level on the short run. 
 
The results have been obtained on the basis of stochastic simulation of each of the 
three components of population change; fertility, mortality, and international 
migration. Simulation of the components relied heavily on three complementary 
methods: 
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• time series analysis for the historical development of key demographic 
indicators, such as the TFR, the life expectancy, and numbers of immigrants and 
emigrants; 
• an analysis of historical forecast errors, assembled on the basis of forecasts 
produced by Statistics Norway since 1969; 
• and finally expert judgement, which was used, for instance, to restrict the 
prediction interval for the TFR or that for the numbers of immigrants and 
emigrants to a reasonable range. 
 
The predictions for each component were calibrated in such a way that the median 
coincided with the Medium Variant value of the 1999-based official population 
forecast of Statistics Norway.  
 
The time series predictions indicated that assumptions on future TFR as employed 
by Statistics Norway in its official population forecasts have estimated coverage 
probabilities of only 46, 31, and 24 per cent in the years 2010, 2030, and 2050. 
The official mortality (i.e. life expectancy) assumptions have higher expected 
accuracy in 2050 (just over 60 per cent), but lower accuracy in the beginning of 
this century (just over a third in the period 2000-2010). 
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Sammendrag 
Nico Keilman, Dinh Quang Pham, Arve Hetland 
Norges usikre demografiske framtid 
 
Sosiale og økonomiske studier 105 • Statistisk sentralbyrå 2001 
Framtiden til enhver befolkning er usikker, men noen av de mange mulige 
utviklingene er mer sannsynlige enn andre. En befolkningsprognose bør derfor 
inneholde to elementer for hver variabel, for eksempel folkemengden på et 
framtidig tidspunkt: en spennvidde (intervall) med mulige resultater, og en sann-
synlighet knyttet til dette intervallet. Til sammen utgjør disse elementene et predik-
sjonsintervall for denne variabelen. Denne rapporten dokumenterer resultatene til 
et forskningsprosjekt hvor formålet har vært å beregne prediksjonsintervaller for 
Norges framtidige befolkning etter kjønn og alder fram til 2050. 
 
Ifølge våre beregninger er oddsen fire mot en (en sannsynlighet på 80 prosent) for 
at folkemengden i Norge, som nå er 4,5 millioner, vil ligge et sted mellom 4,3 og 
5,4 millioner i 2025, og mellom 3,7 og 6,4 millioner i 2050. Dette illustrerer at 
usikkerheten øker med tiden. Større treffsikkerhet (høyere odds) går på bekostning 
av lavere presisjon (større intervaller). Oddsen er 19 mot en (95 prosent sjanse) for 
en folkemengde mellom 4,1 og 5,7 millioner i 2025, og mellom 3,2 og 7,3 
millioner i 2050. Prognosen for barn og eldre viser størst usikkerhet, fordi frukt-
barhet og dødelighet er vanskelig å predikere. Følgelig er prediksjonsintervallet i 
2030 for befolkningen yngre enn 20 år så bredt at denne prognosen ikke særlig er 
informativ. Framtidig inn- og utvandring er også svært usikre, men de har en 
beskjeden effekt på aldersstrukturen. I 2050 har usikkerheten kumulert så sterkt, 
at intervallene er store for tilsynelatende alle aldre, særlig når man betrakter dem 
relativt sett, det vil si i forhold til gjennomsnittsprognosen. I 1999 publiserte 
Statistisk sentralbyrå (SSB) en prognose for blant annet landets befolkning fram til 
2050. Ifølge vår modell er den forventede treffsikkerheten for den samlede folke-
mengden i SSBs prognose i underkant av 67 prosent på lang sikt, og litt høyere 
enn dette nivået på kort sikt.   
 
Vi har beregnet våre resultater ved å ta utgangspunkt i stokastiske simuleringer for 
hver av de tre komponentene for befolkningsendring: fruktbarhet, dødelighet og 
inn- og utvandring. Simuleringene var basert på tre ulike komplementære 
metoder: 
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• tidsserieanalyser for den historiske utviklingen til visse demografiske nøkkel-
variabler, for eksempel Samlet fruktbarhetstall (SFT), forventet levealder, og det 
årlige antall inn- eller utvandrere; 
• en analyse av feil i SSBs gamle befolkningsprognoser siden 1969; 
• subjektive oppfatninger av demografiske eksperter, for eksempel for å begrense 
prediksjonsintervallet til SFT eller inn- og utvandringsstrømmene til en realistisk 
verdi.  
 
Prognosen for hver komponent har blitt kalibrert på en slik måte at medianverdien 
var sammenfallende med SSBs prognosealternativ for middels befolkningsvekst fra 
1999-prognosen. 
 
Vår tidsserieprognose antyder at SSBs anslag for den framtidige utvikling i SFT har 
en forventet treffsikkerhet på bare 46, 31 og 24 prosent henholdsvis i årene 2010, 
2030 og 2050. Den offisielle dødelighetsforutsetningen (forventet levealder) har 
høyere forventet treffsikkerhet i 2050 (litt over 60 prosent), men lavere treff-
sikkerhet i årene 2000-2010 (litt over en tredel). 
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1. The need for stochastic forecasts 
It is easier to predict the main results of the next population forecast for a certain 
country, than to predict the population itself. This is one of the main conclusions 
from analyses into the accuracy of national population forecasts published by 
statistical offices of Western countries after the Second World War. In other 
words: real developments for fertility, mortality and migration are much more 
volatile than usually assumed in forecasts. When studying the population fore-
casts of Western countries, one notes how strikingly similar the predicted values 
in a new forecast are compared to those in the previous forecast. The actual 
variables, however, often show a very different development. While forecasts are 
surprise-free, reality is not. The rapid fall in fertility in many Western countries 
in the 1970s came as a surprise for most population forecasters and other demo-
graphers. The result was too high birth rates, and an overestimation of the 
number of young children. Other forecast variables with large errors are the 
predicted numbers of elderly persons (in particular the oldest old), which were 
far too low in recent decades because of too pessimistic mortality assumptions, 
and the size of immigration, which is determined by largely unforeseeable 
political, economic and legal factors. 
 
The reason that forecasts err is our limited understanding of demographic 
behaviour. Valid behavioural theories that explain birth, death, or migration to a 
sufficient degree have not yet been found. Existing theories have limited validity 
in time or space, or they are strongly conditional or partial, or both (Keyfitz 
1982). When it is difficult to explain demographic processes, then it is even more 
problematic to predict them. The current practice among forecasters is to study 
regularities and irregularities in the historical developments of major demo-
graphic variables such as the Total Fertility Rate and the life expectancy, to 
understand observed trends, and to extrapolate them into the future. 
 
Extrapolation, as next best to prediction on the basis of causal explanation, 
implies that population forecasts are inherently uncertain. Any serious forecaster 
will attempt to include that uncertainty in the forecast in such a way, that it will 
become clear to the user. The standard approach in national population forecasts 
is to formulate two or more sets of assumptions for those key variables of which 
the future development is difficult to predict. Examples are the Total Fertility 
Norway's Uncertain Demographic Future Social and Economic Studies 105 
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Rate and the Life Expectancy at Birth. This approach dates back to at least 1933, 
when Pascal Whelpton computed a population forecast for the United States, in 
which he presented several fertility variants. But the use of forecast variants is 
presumably much older, compare the intervals which Spengler (1935) reports for 
the results of a number of forecasts for the US. Nowadays, statistical agencies in 
15 of the 18 member countries of the European Economic Area (EEA, that is the 
EU- and EFTA-countries, except Switzerland) produce forecasts with between 
two and four fertility variants (Eurostat 1997a, Table 35). In the forecasts made 
in the beginning of the 1990s in those countries, the low and high fertility 
variants defined intervals of between 0.3 and 0.6 children per woman wide for a 
forecast duration of approximately 10 years. Moreover, the first co-ordinated 
population forecast for all 18 EEA-countries has a difference between the high 
and the low fertility variant of 0.5 children per woman in the year 2035 
(Eurostat 1997b, Table 3). 
 
In spite of the general use of forecast variants to express uncertainty, there are 
two reasons why this approach is unsatisfactory from a statistical point of view. 
First, uncertainty is not quantified. Take the example of the current official 
population forecast of Norway. Statistics Norway (1999) assumes in that forecast 
that the period Total Fertility Rate in the year 2010 will be between 1.5 (low 
variant) and 2.1 (high variant) children per woman, with margins that are closer 
to the medium variant of 1.8 in the years prior to 2010. As a consequence, the 
number of children aged 6-12 in 2010 varies from 401 000 to 436 000, with a 
medium forecast of 419 000. However, no probability is attached to the interval 
401 000-436 000. In other words, the user does not know how probable it is that 
the real number of children aged 6-12 in 2010 will lie between 401 000 and 
436 000, or perhaps fall outside that range. But for an educational planner with 
an interest in primary schools it must be of great importance to know whether 
the estimated probability of the number of school children to lie between 
401 000 and 436 000 in the year 2010 is 30, or 60, or perhaps even 90 per cent. 
In the former case, he should incorporate much more flexibility into the school 
planning process, than in the latter. Knowing the probabilities for distinct 
intervals is even more pressing in case the planner's loss function is asymmetric. 
This means that the costs incurred by a forecast that is too low by a certain 
number of children are different from those caused by a forecast that is too high 
by the same number. Hiring extra capacity on short notice may cost more, or 
less, than accepting a certain amount of excess supply of teachers and class-
rooms. To minimize his expected losses, the planner will not use the medium 
forecast, but a number that is higher or lower, depending on his loss function 
and the probabilities involved. 
 
Second, the use of variants is inconsistent, in the sense that two variants that are 
extreme for one variable are not extreme for some other variable. For instance, 
Statistics Norway has assumed high and low trajectories both for future fertility, 
mortality, and net immigration. The combination of high fertility with high life 
expectancy (i.e. low mortality), and high immigration defines the so-called high 
Social and Economic Studies 105 Norway's Uncertain Demographic Future 
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population growth variant. The low population growth variant combines low 
fertility with low life expectancy and low immigration. Now consider the old age 
dependency ratio (OADR), defined as the population aged 67 or over divided by 
the population aged 20-661. In the year 2050, the projected population aged 67+ 
ranges from 1.076 to 1.244 million according to the low and the high population 
growth variants. This interval constitutes 31 per cent of the population aged 67+ 
according to the medium growth variant, in which medium fertility is combined 
with medium life expectancy and medium immigration. Similarly, the population 
aged 20-66 ranges from 2.970 to 3.459 million, or 32 per cent of the value 
according to the medium variant. Yet the OADR-range stretches only from 0.360 
to 0.364, or 1.3 per cent of the OADR-value in the medium variant. This uncer-
tainty is much less than one normally would expect. In fact, the interval is 
considerably larger when one compares two other projection variants, namely 
weak ageing (high fertility together with low life expectancy and high immi-
gration) and strong ageing (low fertility combined with high life expectancy and 
low immigration). According to the latter two variants, the interval for the OADR 
in 2050 is 52 per cent of the OADR-value in the medium-ageing variant. These 
examples show that a variant pair that is extreme for some variable (e.g. the low 
and high population growth variant, when the population by age is analysed) 
need not be extreme for some other variable (e.g. OADR). The reason is that the 
traditional approach assumes perfect correlation both across components and 
over time. In the high population growth variant, each year when fertility is high, 
both life expectancy and immigration are high as well. At the same time, fertility 
(and also life expectancy and migration) is high in each year of the forecast 
period. From a statistical point of view, such perfect correlations across 
components and over time is unlikely. 
 
Because the traditional approach is so unsatisfactory, some statistical agencies 
and individual scholars have in recent years attempted to compute stochastic 
population forecasts, which result in prediction intervals for future population 
size and age pyramids that quantify uncertainty around expected or median 
values. See for instance Hanika et al. (1997) and Lutz and Scherbov (1998a) for 
Austria, Lutz and Scherbov (1998b) for Germany, Alders and De Beer (1998) 
and De Beer and Alders (1999) for the Netherlands, and Alho (1998) for 
Finland. These methods have been inspired by earlier work on stochastic 
forecasts by for instance Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) and Alho (1990). The first 
contribution to the field seems to be the work by Törnqvist (1949) for Finland. 
The present report relies heavily on those studies, yet we have attempted to 
improve certain aspects. New is, we believe,  
• the presentation of prediction intervals for cohort fertility in Section 3.2;  
• our analysis of imposing upper and lower limits to the period Total Fertility 
Rate and the consequences this has for the predictive distribution of the TFR, 
in Section 3.1;  
                                                     
1 The legal retirement age is 67 in Norway. 
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• the emphasis on sampling errors for age-specific birth and death rates in 
Chapters 3 and 4;  
• and the systematic comparison between simulated prediction intervals for 
the TFR, the life expectancy, and the age structure, and those constructed on 
the basis of historical forecasts. 
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2. Approaches to stochastic 
population forecasting 
2.1. General aspects 
The cohort-component approach is the standard approach in population 
forecasting (Keilman and Cruijsen 1992). In short, this approach starts from a 
table with a known population at some recent point in time, broken down by sex 
and one-year age groups. This so-called base population is moved forward in 
time, one year a time, so that all persons move up one age group. Assumed 
mortality rates by age and sex determine the number of survivors from the 
original population, one year later. Fertility rates broken down by age of the 
mother are applied to women in fertile ages, and the result is the number of live 
births during the year. An assumed sex ratio at birth, and sex-specific infant 
mortality rates determine surviving numbers of boys and girls in the youngest 
age class one year later. Finally, emigration rates and immigration numbers, both 
broken down by sex and age, result in flows of emigrants and immigrants. 
Emigrants are subtracted, and immigrants are added to the base population, 
after having been exposed to appropriate risks of mortality (immigrants only), of 
fertility (both immigrants and emigrants), and of emigration (immigrants only). 
The result is an updated population by sex and age, one year later and one year 
older. Repeated application of this process gives a forecast for a period as long as 
the forecaster wishes to have it. 
 
The process described above requires hundreds of input parameters for each 
forecast year: 35 fertility rates by age of the mother, 100 mortality rates for each 
sex, and some 70 migration parameters for male and female immigration and 
emigration. Thus a forecast 50 years ahead, say, involves thousands of 
parameters. A stochastic forecast based on the cohort component approach 
requires in principle that one specifies the joint statistical distribution of all those 
parameters. In practice this is too complex a task, and one breaks up the joint 
distribution in several other distributions. In this respect, four types of 
correlation are important: correlation between components, correlation across 
age, correlation across sexes, and correlation across time (serial correlation).  
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In a Western country such as Norway, there is little or no reason to assume 
correlation between the components of fertility, mortality and migration2. Nor is 
there any empirical evidence of such correlation (Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994; 
Keilman 1997). Therefore, in the stochastic forecasts of the US, Austria, 
Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands, the three components were considered 
independent of each other (Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994; Lutz and Scherbov 1998a, 
1998b; Alho 1998; De Beer and Alders 1999).   
 
Correlation across time is important for each component. Levels of fertility and 
mortality change only slowly over time. Thus when fertility or mortality is high 
one year, a high level the next year is also likely. This implies a strong auto-
correlation for these two components. International migration is much more 
volatile, but economic, legal, political, and social conditions stretching over 
several years steer migration flows to a certain extent, and some degree of 
autocorrelation should be expected. 
 
Men and women display similar behaviour regarding mortality and migration. 
This gives rise to a certain degree of correlation across sexes for these two 
components. 
  
Correlation across age is strong for each component. The age profiles of fertility 
(by mother's age), mortality and migration are highly regular. Age-specific 
fertility has one top around 25-30 years. Age-specific mortality falls from rather 
high levels of infant and child mortality to low levels for teenagers, and rises 
subsequently to a maximum for the oldest old. The age pattern of migration is bi-
modal, with tops for young adults and children of pre-school age, and much 
lower levels for intermediate and old ages.  
 
A common approach in stochastic population forecasting is to assume some 
statistical distribution for a selected key parameter for each component in the 
future, both its level and development over time. Examples are the Total Fertility 
Rate (TFR) for fertility, the Life Expectancy at Birth for male and female 
mortality, and the annual number of net-immigrations. Three main methods to 
arrive at such a distribution may be distinguished: time-series methods, expert 
judgement, and extrapolation of observed errors in historical forecasts. Time-
series methods and expert judgement result in the distribution of the parameter 
in question around its expected value. In contrast, an extrapolation of empirical 
errors gives the distribution centred around zero (or around the expected error), 
and the expected value is taken from a deterministic forecast computed in the 
traditional manner. 
                                                     
2 In developing countries, disasters and catastrophes may have an impact both on mortality, fertility, 
and migration, and a correlation between the three components cannot be excluded. Western 
countries with extremely high immigration from developing countries may have a positive 
correlation between their levels of immigration and childbearing. In Norway this effect is negligible.  
Social and Economic Studies 105 Norway's Uncertain Demographic Future 
 17 
Time-series methods are based on the assumption that historical values of the 
variable of interest have been generated by means of a statistical model which 
also holds for the future. A widely used method is that of ARIMA (Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average)-models (Box and Jenkins 1970). Since ARIMA 
models consider the time series as stochastic, both point predictions and interval 
predictions are possible. Time series models were developed for short horizons. 
When applied for long-run population forecasting, the point forecast may 
become unreasonable, and/or the prediction intervals may become excessively 
wide. Judgmental methods (see below) can be applied to correct or constrain 
such unreasonable predictions (Lee 1993; Tuljapurkar 1996). 
 
Expert judgement can be used when expected values and corresponding pre-
diction intervals are hard to obtain by formal methods. In demographic fore-
casting, the method has been pioneered by Lutz and colleagues (Lutz et al. 1986; 
Hanika et al. 1997; Lutz and Scherbov 1998a, 1998b). A group of experts is 
asked to indicate the probability that a key parameter, such as the TFR, falls 
within a certain pre-specified range for some target year, for instance the range 
determined by the high and the low variant of an independently prepared 
population forecast. The subjective probability distributions obtained this way 
from a number of experts are combined in order to reduce individual bias. A 
major weakness of this approach, at least based upon the experiences from other 
disciplines, is that experts often are too confident, i.e. the prediction intervals 
they give tend to be too narrow (Armstrong 1985). 
 
Extrapolation of empirical errors requires observed errors from historical fore-
casts. Next, formal or informal methods may be used to predict the errors for the 
current forecast. Keyfitz (1981) and Stoto (1983) were among the first to use 
this approach in demographic forecasting. They assessed the accuracy of 
historical forecasts for population growth rates. The Panel on Population 
Projections of the US National Research Council (NRC 2000) elaborated further 
on this idea and developed a statistical model for the uncertainty around UN-
forecasts for all countries of the world. Others have investigated and modelled 
the accuracy of predicted TFR, life expectancy, immigration levels and age 
structures (Keilman 1997; De Beer 1997). An important problem is that time 
series of historical errors are usually rather short, as forecasts prepared in the 
1950s or earlier generally have been documented not well enough.  
 
The three approaches are complementary, and elements of all three are often 
used in actual practice. For instance, time series methods are inherently 
judgmental, in particular when a certain form of the extrapolation model or 
when the length of the historical series is chosen. The subjective decisions taken 
in this respect may have important consequences for the shape of the prediction 
intervals. Furthermore, prediction intervals, either obtained by time series 
methods or by expert opinion, are frequently checked against historical error 
patterns (e.g. Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994; Alho 1998). 
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Irrespective of the method that was used to determine the prediction intervals 
for all future fertility, mortality and migration parameters, the next step is to 
apply these to the base population in order to compute prediction intervals for 
future population size and age pyramids. There are two common approaches to 
obtain such intervals: an analytical approach and a simulation approach. 
 
The analytical approach is based on a stochastic cohort component model, in 
which the statistical distributions for the fertility, mortality and migration 
parameters are transformed into statistical distributions for the size of the 
population and its age-sex structure. Alho and Spencer (1985) and Cohen (1986) 
employ such an analytical approach, but they need strong assumptions. Lee and 
Tuljapurkar (1994) give approximate expressions for the second moments of the 
distributions. 
 
The simulation approach avoids the simplifying assumptions and the approxi-
mations that have been necessary hitherto in the analytical approach. The idea is 
simply to compute several hundreds or thousands of forecast variants (“sample 
paths”) based on input parameter values for fertility, mortality and migration 
that are randomly drawn from their respective distributions. The results are 
stored in a database, and the predictive distribution for a certain variable follows 
immediately from the histogram of that variable. Early contributions based on 
the idea of simulation are those by Keyfitz (1985), Pflaumer (1986, 1988), and 
Kuijsten (1988). 
2.2. The approach in this report 
In the current project, the prediction intervals for age-specific fertility, mortality, 
immigration, and emigration have been computed using a common approach. A 
short general description is given below, whereas details are contained in 
chapters 3-5. Prediction intervals for the size of the population and its age-sex 
distribution have been determined by means of stochastic simulation. 
 
The four components were assumed independent.3 The approach relies heavily 
on time-series models for one or more key parameters for each component: 
Stochastic simulation was used to obtain future values of the key parameters 
and, for fertility and mortality, stochastic age patterns.4 Each set of key 
parameters was assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution, with a 
known vector of expected values and known covariance matrix. Multivariate 
normally distributed numbers were drawn from each distribution using Cholesky 
decomposition of the covariance matrices (Bratley et al. 1983). Repeated 
                                                     
3 The correlation across the sexes for mortality (Chapter 4) and migration (Chapter 5) is accounted 
for. A possible correlation between immigration and emigration (for instance caused by return 
migration), or one between migration of men and women (family migration, family reunification) is 
ignored. Extensive empirical tests did not result in clearly interpretable patterns, see Chapter 5. 
4 The age patterns for immigration and emigration were assumed deterministic, see Chapter 5. 
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stochastic simulation resulted in 5 000 sample paths for each age-specific 
parameter.  
 
For fertility, we assumed that a Poisson process generates births in each forecast 
year. The intensity of that process depends strongly on the age of the mother. 
Thus the parameter of the Poisson process, that is, the fertility rate, varies by 
age. For a given year or a given birth cohort of women, we assumed that the age 
pattern of fertility follows a Gamma curve. This is a mathematical function, 
which consists of a Gamma density and a scaling parameter. The Gamma curve 
has four parameters: the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), the Mean Age at Child-
bearing (MAC), the Variance in that age (VAR), and the minimum age. The four 
parameters were estimated on the basis of data on Norwegian births in one-year 
age groups for each year in the period from 1900 to 1995. This resulted in a time 
series of parameter estimates. The series for three of the four parameters (TFR, 
MAC, and VAR) were modelled by means of a multivariate time series model of 
the ARIMA-type. The minimum age was kept constant at its value as estimated 
for recent years. Predictions were made by stochastic simulation for the period 
1996-2050 for the remaining three parameters. Extreme values, for instance 
TFR-values lower than 0.5, or higher than four children per woman, were 
rejected, and the simulations were repeated until 5 000 time paths with 
admissible values were obtained. The Gamma curve was used to transform the 
parameter predictions back into future age-specific fertility rates. 
  
For mortality, a first order homogeneous Markov process with constant intensity 
was assumed for each age and both sexes. The intensities were estimated by 
means of the corresponding age and sex-specific death rates. The predictions 
consisted of three steps. First, a life table calculation resulted in annual values of 
the life expectancy at birth for men and women. The two time series of life 
expectancies for the period 1945-1995 were modelled by means of a multivariate 
ARIMA model, and stochastic simulation resulted in prediction intervals for male 
and female life expectancies for the period 1996-2050. The constant term in the 
ARIMA model was adjusted in such a way that the expected life expectancy 
values in 2050 coincided with target values assumed by Statistics Norway in its 
official population forecast. Second, we assumed that for each year the age 
pattern of mortality could be described by means of a Heligman-Pollard (H-P) 
curve. This is a mathematical function with eight parameters. The parameters 
were estimated on the basis of data on Norwegian deaths for men and women in 
one-year age groups for each year in the period from 1900 to 1995. This resulted 
in two time series of parameter estimates, one for each sex. The time series for 
the years 1945-1995 were modelled by means of multivariate time series models 
of the ARIMA-type. Stochastic simulation resulted in 5 000 multivariate sample 
paths for the H-P parameters for the period 1996-2050. The H-P curve was used 
to transform the parameter predictions back into future age-specific mortality 
rates. For each year in the prediction period, a life table calculation summarized 
those rates into one indicator, viz. the life expectancy at birth. These life 
expectancies were assembled in a look-up table, together with the underlying  
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H-P parameter values. In the third and final step, H-P parameter values from the 
look-up table were assigned to life expectancy values for each sample path, 
predicted in the first step, by matching life expectancy values from the first and 
the second step, controlling for calendar year and sex. The result was an age 
pattern for male and female mortality for each year in the future and each 
simulation run. 
 
For international migration, we distinguished between immigration and 
emigration flows. Annual numbers for each flow, observed for the period 1967-
1997 were modelled by means of univariate ARIMA time series models. 
Stochastic simulation resulted in 5 000 sample paths with annual numbers of 
immigrants and emigrants for the period 1996-2050. The constant terms in the 
ARIMA models were adjusted in such a way, that target levels of annual 
immigration and emigration assumed by Statistics Norway were predicted. 
Predicted numbers of immigrants and emigrants were broken down by sex on 
the basis of randomly drawn shares for men and women. This resulted in four 
flows: immigration and emigration by sex. Age-specific numbers for each of the 
four flows were obtained on the basis of a Rogers-Castro (R-C) curve with six 
parameters5. The R-C curve was fitted to age-specific shares for each of the four 
flows in each calendar year. The resulting time series of R-C parameters were 
predicted into the future by means of simple extrapolation procedures. Predicted 
R-C parameters were used to transform predicted flows back into predicted 
numbers of immigrants and emigrants by sex and age. The age pattern for each 
flow was the same across sample paths. 
 
Since the ultimate purpose was to generate stochastic population forecasts, much 
attention was given to an appropriate quantification of uncertainty. In the 
present approach, there are four main sources of uncertainty attached to future 
birth and death rates, and migration numbers: 
 
1. sample variation in the historical age-specific rates; 
2. errors in the parameter estimates of the age pattern curves (Gamma curve 
for fertility, Heligman-Pollard curve for mortality, Rogers-Castro curve for 
migration); 
3. residual variance in each time series model; 
4. estimation errors in the parameter estimates of each time series model. 
 
Earlier studies of a similar nature, such as Bell (1992, 1997), De Beer (1989, 
1992), Duchêne and Gillet-De Stefano (1974), Knudsen et al. (1993), and 
Thompson et al (1989) have ignored one or more of these sources. Our strategy 
has been, whenever possible, to take due account of all four. This gave 
reasonable prediction intervals for mortality, but for fertility the uncertainty was 
                                                     
5 The retirement peak in observed immigration and emigration turned out to be negligible in the 
Norwegian data, see Chapter 5. 
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clearly too large, and prediction intervals were too wide. Therefore uncertainty 
connected to future fertility was reduced in an ad-hoc manner by subjectively 
decreasing prediction intervals for some key parameters. 
 
For migration, observed patterns were so volatile, that the time series 
extrapolations for absolute numbers of immigration and emigration resulted in 
excessively wide prediction intervals after a few years already. Our strategy has 
been to fix the width of the intervals after an initial period of five years. 
 
Time series methods as described in Section 2.1 have been used to generate 
prediction intervals for fertility, mortality and migration parameters, see 
Chapters 3-5. For the base population it was assumed that this was perfectly 
known. In countries with defective data this is obviously not a good assumption, 
and the base population should be considered stochastic as well. 
 
In summary, our stochastic population forecasts are based on a combination of 
three different methods: time series extrapolation, inspection of observed errors 
in historical forecasts, and the use of expert judgement. Most attention was given 
to time series extrapolation, in order to obtain a correct initial specification of 
(co-)variances and autocorrelations. For mortality, this resulted in acceptable 
prediction intervals. But for fertility and international migration, time series 
extrapolation gave too wide intervals around key parameters, which were 
reduced in an ad hoc manner on the basis of subjective decisions. Observed 
errors for fertility, mortality and the age structure were used to check the 
plausibility of the resulting intervals. 
 
Although subjective decisions regarding the width of prediction intervals, the 
choice of time series model, and the selection of the estimation period certainly 
will have influenced our final results, expert judgement played a less important 
role than in the stochastic forecasts mentioned in Section 2.1. By emphasizing 
time series extrapolation, we have tried to avoid too narrow intervals as a 
consequence of being too confident in one’s ability to predict demographic 
developments accurately.  
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3. Fertility 
The methodology used for fertility extrapolations has been reported extensively 
in papers by Keilman and Pham (2000) and Keilman and Hetland (1999). 
Section 3.1 will summarize the main features. 
3.1. Period fertility 
3.1.1. Historical patterns 
Assume that a group of Y(x) women aged x give birth to B(x) children in a 
certain year. Assume further that a Poisson process generates the births. 
Maximum Likelihood estimators for the intensity of the process, and its 
corresponding variance are 
 
(3.1) Fx = B(x)/Y(x), and 
 
 Var(Fx) = B(x)/Y
2(x) = Fx/Y(x) 
 
The estimator Fx is the traditional age-specific birth rate. 
  
We have used the Norwegian age-specific birth rates for the years 1900-1993 
computed by Brunborg and Mamelund (1994). These were supplemented with 
rates for the years 1994 and 1995. The age range was from 16 to 44. When 
computing person years of exposure, we ignored mortality and international 
migration, and used the population of women at the beginning of each year, 
broken down in one-year age groups. 
 
The array of 29 rates for each year can be summarized by means of a parametric 
curve, which is a function of age. Thanks to the regular shape of the age pattern 
of fertility, such a function contains only a few parameters, usually three to five. 
Various curves fit the data well: normal, lognormal, double exponential, Coale-
Trussell, Hadwiger, polynomial, gamma, and logistic curves, to name the most 
important ones. Several authors have noted the attractive properties of the 
Gamma curve. The fit is usually good, and the parameters can be interpreted, 
after an appropriate transformation, in a straightforward way. See Bell (1997), 
Social and Economic Studies 105 Norway's Uncertain Demographic Future 
 23 
Hoem et al. (1981), and Duchêne and Gillet-De Stefano (1974). Denote the 
fertility intensity for age x as fx. The Gamma curve is defined as  
 
(3.2) [ ])x(exp)x(
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The four parameters αi are to be estimated from the data. Γ(.) is the Gamma 
function defined by  
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α1 represents the TFR, whereas α4 is the minimum age at childbearing. The 
parameters α2 and α3 have no immediate demographic interpretation. However, 
fx/α1 is the Gamma density, with mean α4+(α3/α2) and variance α3/α2
2. 
Therefore it is customary to introduce the following transformation 
 
(3.3) β1 = α1 
 β2 = α4 + α3/α2 
 β3 = α3/α22 
 β4 = α4. 
 
Hence parameters β1 and β4 have the same interpretation as α1 (TFR) and α4 
(minimum age). β2 represents the mean age at childbearing, while β3 is the 
variance in that age. The β-parameters have been estimated by means of non-
linear regression, by minimizing the following weighted sum of squares 
 
(3.4) ∑x wx(Fx - fx)2. 
 
wx is the inverse value of the variance of Fx, see expression (3.1),  reflecting the 
“measurement error” for the rate Fx: a small variance indicates a precise estimate 
for the intensity, and vice versa.6 Hence ages for which the variance is large get 
less weight in the regression than those with smaller variances. Weighted least 
squares estimation is approximately equivalent with Maximum Likelihood 
estimation of the parameters βi, with births B(x) and exposure time Y(x) as data 
(Van Imhoff 1991). 
                                                     
6 Since in the end we are concerned with errors in the projected numbers of births, we consider the 
absolute size of the measurement error, not the relative size, which would amount to Var(Fx)/Fx. 
Thus for some ages the measurement error is small simply because the intensity is low.  
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The four β-parameters and the corresponding covariance matrix, together with 
their variances were estimated on the basis of Norwegian birth rates for each of 
the years 1900-1995. Figures 3.1-3.3 present estimates for β1, β2, and β3 with 
corresponding 95 per cent confidence intervals. The TFR, the mean age at 
childbearing, and the variance computed in the traditional demographic manner 
(i.e. moment estimators TFR=∑x Fx, m=∑x x.Fx/TFR and s2=∑x (Fx-m)2/TFR2) are 
also given. The latter estimators are only influenced by Poisson variability, not by 
the fit of the Gamma curve. For the minimum age β4 we found that estimates in 
recent years were invariably equal to the boundary value of zero (after initial 
values around 14-15 years of age in the first half of the century).7 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Total Fertility Rate estimates and 95 per cent confidence interval 
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7 Estimates for the minimum age β4 fell below 14 in 1975 and decreased further to reach zero in 
1991. During the same period, the estimates for the mean age at childbearing β2 rose from 26.6 to 
28.3 years. Together with the relatively low estimates for the Total Fertility Rate β1 during these 
years (< 2), the predicted birth rates at ages below 16 are still negligible, in spite of the unrealistic 
estimate for the minimum age. 
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Figure 3.2. Estimates for mean age at childbearing and 95 per cent confidence interval 
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Figure 3.3. Estimates for variance in childbearing age and 95 per cent confidence interval 
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Similar to many other Western countries in this century, Norway had two periods 
with a strong fertility decrease (Figure 3.1). The first one, which started around 
1880, ended in the 1930s, whereas the second one took place at the end of the 
1960s and during the 1970s. The baby boom of the 1950s and 1960s was to a 
large extent the consequence of a decrease in the mean age at childbearing for 
women born in the years 1920-1945. This led not only to a fall in the period 
mean age (see Figure 3.2), but also to rather high period-TFR values (Figure 
3.1). The period-TFR attained its minimum in the years 1983 and 1984, when it 
was as low as 1.66 children per woman. After a rise towards 1.9 children per 
woman in 1990, the TFR has been rather constant. But in recent decades, 
women get their children at increasingly higher ages, compare the strong rise in 
the period mean age at childbearing in Figure 3.2. Facilitated by modern 
contraceptive methods, growing shares of young Norwegian adults postponed 
the birth of their first child and took some form of education at the tertiary level 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Next they worked some years before they entered 
parenthood (Kravdal 1994). Much of the fertility decrease during this century 
was caused by a reduction of higher-parity births, which generally take place at 
high ages.  
 
The 95 per cent confidence intervals for the βi are rather wide in the years 1900-
1925 and 1945-1965, indicating a relatively bad fit. After 1980, the fit is excellent. 
The traditional TFR (moment estimate) coincides with the estimates from the 
Gamma curve from 1970 onwards, and it falls within the 95 per cent confidence 
bounds from 1940. It is much lower in the first half of the century. However, one 
does not know whether the traditional TFR or our Gamma-based TFR are good 
approximations to the real (but unknown) Total Fertility, since both are only an 
estimate of the latter. Figure 3.4 illustrates how the fit improves over the years. 
 
The result of the curve fitting exercise described above is a series of estimates for 
the four parameters of the Gamma curve for each year between 1900 and 1995, 
and the corresponding estimated covariance matrix for each year. A multivariate 
ARIMA model has been used to predict three of the four parameters: β1, β2, and β3. As noted earlier, the minimum age of childbearing β4 fell from 14 in 1975 to 
zero in 1991, and remained at that level since. We predict that β4 will equal zero 
in the future, too.8 
 
Let Ct = (ln(β1,t), ln(β2,t), ln(β3,t))` be a column  vector with the first three 
Gamma curve parameters in year t in logarithmic form. First differences of C led 
to stationarity, and we found that a multivariate ARIMA (1,1,0) model fitted the 
data well. The model is of the form  
 
(3.5) Zt = φZt-1 + εt, 
                                                     
8 Note that Thompson et al. (1989) find a similar (although steeper) drop in the minimum age. 
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Figure 3.4. Age-specific birth rates, empirical values and Gamma curve fit 
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where Zt=Ct-Ct-1, φ is a fixed 3x3-matrix of coefficients, and εt=(ε1,t, ε2,t, ε3,t)` is a 
multivariate normal column vector with mean 0 and constant covariance matrix 
∑ε. We deliberately omitted an intercept from the model, so that we avoid 
predicting an indefinitely increasing or decreasing pattern in βt.9 Estimation was 
done in such a way that years in which variances and covariances for the β-
estimates were large, got less weight. 
 
We have limited the estimations to the years 1945-1995. On the one hand, a long 
series is desirable on statistical grounds. On the other hand, there is little reason 
to believe that the childbearing behaviour of women in the first half of the 
century was so similar to that in more recent decades, that both can be captured 
by one model. Moreover, the fit of the Gamma curve was much better in the 
second half of this century than in the first half. We have also investigated the 
sensitivity of our predictions for choosing the shorter periods 1960-1995 and 
1975-1995 (details not given here). The conclusion was that opting for the 
                                                     
9 Preliminary tests on the basis of a univariate model for the Total Fertility Rate showed that this 
was an appropriate choice. 
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period 1945-1995 strikes a good balance between a high residual variance 
(1960-1995), and an imprecise estimate for the autoregressive coefficient (1975-
1995). 
 
Estimates for the elements of φ and corresponding standard errors are listed in 
Table 3.1. Diagonal elements are high and strongly significant. All but one ( 31φˆ ) 
of the off-diagonal elements turned out to be non-significant at the 5 per cent 
level in a trial calculation. These were set equal to zero, and the model was re-
estimated with those restrictions, using Restricted Least Squares (Lütkepohl 
1993). 
 
The estimated covariances for the non-zero ijφˆ -elements are given in Table 3.2, 
whereas Table 3.3 contains estimates for the residual covariances Σε. Much of the 
uncertainty, relatively speaking, concerns the TFR, as witnessed by the high 
estimate of σε,11. This is explained by the large fluctuations in the TFR since 1945 
(see Figure 3.1), whereas those in the mean age (Figure 3.2) or in the variance 
(Figure 3.3) were much smaller. 
 
 
Table 3.1. Estimates of φij 
 11φˆ 12φˆ  13φˆ 21φˆ 22φˆ 23φˆ  31φˆ 32φˆ  33φˆ  
Estimate 0.6694 0 0 0 0.8852 0 0.0909 0 0.3089 
Standard Error 0.1044 - - - 0.0735 - 0.0419 - 0.1337 
 
 
Table 3.2. Covariance estimates for non-zero elements of φˆ 1 
 11φˆ  22φˆ 31φˆ  33φˆ  
  x10-3   
    
11φˆ  10.185 0.011 -0.354 -0.000 
22φˆ  0.011 4.547 0.023 -0.130 
31φˆ  -0.354 0.023 1.644 -2.484 
33φˆ  -0.000 -0.130 -2.484 16.588 
1 Covariances between other elements of φˆ  are zero. 
 
 
Table 3.3. Estimates of Σε=(σε,ij)
1 
 11,εˆσ 12,εˆσ  13,ˆεσ 22,εˆσ 23,εˆσ  33,εˆσ  
  x10-3   
    
 0.703 0.005 0.105 0.007 0.015 0.309 
1 Only the upper triangular part of the symmetric matrix is given. 
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3.1.2. Future fertility 
We simulated 5 000 sample paths for the vector β, each one from 1996 until 
2050. For every sample path we drew one value for the matrix φ, and 55 values 
for the vector ε, one for each year. The estimates of both φ and ε follow a 
multivariate normal distribution. The mean and the covariance of φˆ  are given in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The mean of $ε  is the null-vector, while its covariance 
estimates are contained in Table 3.3. Multivariate normally distributed numbers 
were drawn from these two distributions using Cholesky decomposition of the 
covariance matrices (Bratley et al. 1983). 
 
As could be expected, the long-run simulations show excessively wide prediction 
intervals, see Figures 3.5-3.7. The average values for the three parameters in 
2050 are 2.21 (TFR), 30.9 (mean age), and 28.3 (variance), while the medians 
are 1.86 children per woman, 30.2 years, and 27.6 years2, respectively. The odds 
are two against one that the TFR in 2050 will lie between 1.1 and 3.3 children 
per woman, while the 95 per cent prediction interval is (0.5, 6.1) in that year. 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Total Fertility Rate 
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Figure 3.6. Mean age at childbearing 
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Figure 3.7. Variance in childbearing age 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
95% High
80% High
67% High
Mean
67% Low
80% Low
95% Low
  
Social and Economic Studies 105 Norway's Uncertain Demographic Future 
 31 
The expected probability that the TFR will exceed 6.1 children per woman in 
2050 is only 2.5 per cent. Yet it is difficult to imagine such extremely high levels 
of childbearing in a country like Norway. The highest TFR ever recorded for 
Norway is (the moment estimate of) 4.8 in 1879, the highest value since 1845, 
see Brunborg and Mamelund (1994). With a TFR of 6.1 children per woman or 
more, fertility would exceed the historical maximum by more than one child, and 
it would exceed the current level in many less developed countries. Clearly, the 
model predictions for the middle of the next century cannot be considered as 
realistic. Now assume (somewhat subjectively) that a fertility level of more than 
four children per woman on the medium and long term should be rejected (even 
when the probability of such a level is only a few per cent). Then we see that the 
model gives reasonable results up to around 2020 or perhaps 2030. Beyond that, 
prediction intervals are too wide. One has to take recourse to other methods 
when predictions so far ahead are required. The easiest one is to assume that in 
2030, say, uncertainty is already so large that it will not increase any more (e.g. 
Alho and Spencer 1997). In that case prediction intervals are constant after 
2030. A more sophisticated one is to assume that there is an upper bound to 
fertility levels in Norway. This will be analysed below. 
3.1.3. Rejecting extreme values 
The reason why the ARIMA model on the long run produces wide prediction 
intervals for the period TFR is that it contains no extraneous information beyond 
the past data. Several factors are associated with the development of fertility 
after World War II in Norway, similar to other countries. Important elements in 
this respect are the introduction of modern contraception, the adoption of new 
norms and values with respect to childbearing and partnership, increased 
interest in tertiary education, and growing levels of labour force participation 
among women (Kravdal 1994; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). None of these 
factors is, or could be, explicitly modelled. It is reasonable to expect that they 
will be in operation in the future, too. Yet we have no idea to what extent these 
or other factors will constrain Norwegian fertility in the next century, be it period 
or cohort developments. Therefore, we used the ARIMA time series model to 
carry out a number of experimental simulations in which upper and lower 
bounds were imposed on the period TFR.  
 
The logarithmic transformation of the TFR ensures that the predicted TFR never 
falls below zero. However, the predicted TFR virtually has no upper limit. There-
fore, upper limits were defined ranging from 2 to 5, lower limits ranging from 0 
to 1, and simulations were carried out for a certain combination of upper and 
lower TFR limit. Simulations that resulted, for any future year, in a predicted 
TFR outside the range defined by the upper and lower limits were rejected, and 
new simulations were generated until we had obtained 5 000 simulations with 
admissible values. 
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Figure 3.8. Period TFR, 95 per cent prediction interval, minimum TFR=0 
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We experimented with upper limits for the period TFR of 2, 3, 4, and 5 children 
per woman, and lower limits equal to 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1 child per woman 
on average. Selected results are given in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. 
 
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show that imposing an upper TFR limit equal to 2 children per 
woman is unrealistic. It implies that the upper bound of the 95 per cent prediction 
interval is constant over the years, whereas the upper 67 per cent bound is pressed 
progressively downwards. Hence also the mean and the median TFR will fall over 
the years. With an upper limit equal to 3 children, the upper 67 per cent bound is 
almost constant, although it tends to decrease slightly between 2009 (2.15 children 
per woman) and 2031 (2.10). A more realistic pattern, with increasing upper 
bounds, is shown when the upper TFR limit is set equal to 4 or higher. 
 
In the short run, the width of the 67 per cent prediction interval varies little 
when the upper limit becomes less strict. In the year 2010, the width is 0.80 
children per woman when the TFR is limited to three children at the most, and 
0.92 and 0.95 children per woman for maximum TFR values of 4 and 5, 
respectively. In the long run however, uncertainty (expressed in terms of the 
width of the 67 per cent prediction interval) grows faster when the maximum 
TFR is increased: from 1.31 children per woman for a maximum TFR of 3, to 
1.64 and 1.88 children per woman for maximum TFRs of 4 and 5, respectively. 
The width of the 95 per cent prediction interval is much more influenced, also on 
the short run. In 2010 it amounts to 1.60, 1.92, and 2.06 children per woman for 
maximum TFR values of 3, 4, and 5. 
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Figure 3.9. Period TFR, 67 per cent prediction interval, minimum TFR=0 
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Thus we see that the 95 per cent prediction interval is much stronger influenced 
than the 67 per cent interval. The reason is that the upper and lower 2.5 per cent 
of the simulated values define the bounds of the 95 per cent interval. These 
bounds are rather sensitive to outliers, which is not the case for the 67 per cent 
bounds.  
 
When the lower limit is successively increased from zero to one child per woman, 
both the upper and the lower bounds of the intervals are pressed upwards, the 
lower bounds somewhat more than the upper ones (figures not shown here). In 
other words, the intervals are slightly narrower than with a lower TFR limit set 
to zero, as expected. For instance, with a minimum TFR equal to one, the 67 per 
cent interval in the year 2010 is 0.72, 0.82, and 0.90 children per woman wide 
when the maximum TFR is set to 3, 4, or 5. In 2050 the corresponding ranges 
are 1.02, 1.42, and 1.72. In spite of these differences, the shapes of the 
prediction intervals remain the same as those in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. 
 
On the basis of the experiments reported in this section, we decided to restrict 
the period TFR to values between 0.5 and 4.0 children per woman. At the same 
time, restrictions on other parameters were introduced. By the middle of the 
next century, the childbearing behaviour of Norwegian women may be very 
different from todays. Medical technology may have made it possible to postpone 
childbearing to ages well beyond 50. But even then, a mean age at childbearing 
of 50 years, or a variance in the age at childbearing of 400, is clearly unrealistic.  
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Figure 3.10. Prediction intervals for TFR, TFR restricted to (0.5, 4.0) 
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At the same time it is unrealistic to assume that teenage fertility has become so 
important that the mean age falls below 20. Thus we used the following 
additional restrictions: 20<MAC<40, and 0<VAR<250. Finally, a restriction 
was imposed on the elements of the matrix φ: each of those was required to lie 
between minus one and one, in order to ensure stationarity. Figure 3.10 
illustrates the resulting prediction intervals for the TFR based on 5 000 
simulations with admissible values. 
 
For each simulation and each calendar year in the period 1996-2050, the Gamma 
curve transformed the four summary indicators into age-specific fertility rates. 
We have deliberately chosen not to censor rates beyond age 50. Recent medical 
advances have led to an increased demand for Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(such as in vitro fertilization) after age 30 in Western countries. We cannot 
exclude the possibility that in the middle of the next century childbearing will be 
an option for women older than 50. It has been suggested that frozen ova may be 
taken from the woman at age 22, say, and that these may be fertilized and 
implanted later (Beets 1996). The predicted rates, however, are small, and for 
practical reasons we used the age of 65 as the highest fertile age. At the other 
end of the age scale, there are some very low rates at ages below 15. These have 
been ignored in the cohort-component projections of Chapter 6. 
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Table 3.4. Fertility assumptions in Statistics Norway’s 1996-based population forecast  
 Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)  Mean age at childbearing (yrs) 
 
Low  
variant 
Medium 
variant
High 
variant
 
Low 
variant 
Medium 
variant 
High 
variant
19951 1.86 1.86 1.86  28.79 28.79 28.79
2000 1.79 1.86 1.95  29.34 29.20 29.03
2010 and beyond 1.68 1.86 2.10  30.50 30.00 29.50
1 Values computed from birth statistics.  
Source: Statistics Norway (1997). 
 
 
The High-Low range for the TFR in Statistics Norway’s 1996-based population 
forecast is 0.42 children per woman in 2010, see Table 3.4. A comparison with 
Figure 3.10 tells us that the estimated coverage probability for that range is only 
32 per cent. In later years, the coverage probability falls to levels of 20 per cent 
in 2030 and 15 per cent in 2050. The low coverage probability was one of the 
reasons why Statistics Norway increased the High-Low range for the TFR in its 
1999-based forecast to [1.5, 2.1] for the years 2010 and later. This improved the 
estimated coverage probabilities to 46, 31, and 24 per cent in the years 2010, 
2030, and 2050.  
3.1.4. Logistic transformation 
Lee (1993) has used a different method for restricting predicted TFR-values. He 
first transformed the annual TFR for the USA into  
 
 gt = ln{(TFRt - L)/(U - TFRt)} 
 
where L and U are pre-specified lower and upper limits for the TFR. Next he 
identified and estimated an ARIMA-model for the transformed variable gt. This 
logit transformation will produce a forecast for the TFR that will never exceed U 
or fall below L. However, as noted by Alho and Spencer (1997), such a model 
may have undesirable consequences. They demonstrated that when gt follows a 
random walk process, then TFRt will eventually be “absorbed” close to U or L for 
large enough t. This anomaly also showed up in our case. We selected L=1.0 and 
U=3.1, and identified a univariate ARIMA (2,1,0)-process for the logit 
transformed Norwegian TFR. (The maximum TFR-value in the period 1945-1995 
was 3.02 in 1964. Hence an upper bound of 3.0 would cause the transformation 
to break down in that year.) Prediction intervals were computed analytically, 
assuming that the estimated coefficients of the ARIMA-process are equal to the 
real ones. In 2050, the bounds of the 67 per cent prediction interval (1.12, 2.86) 
were very close to those of the 95 per cent interval (1.01, 3.08). In the long run, 
the boundaries of any interval approach the upper and lower bounds U and L 
arbitrarily closely. The conclusion is that Lee’s logit transformation cannot be 
used for constraining our prediction intervals. 
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3.1.5. Sensitivity analyses 
The analysis in Section 3.1.1 differs from earlier studies in three respects. First, 
as Van Imhoff (1991) has noted, curve-fitting exercises almost invariably ignore 
the fact that a birth rate is not an observed quantity, but an estimate of the 
parameter of an underlying model. See, for example, Bell (1992, 1997); De Beer 
(1992); Duchêne and Gillet-De Stefano (1974); Knudsen et al. (1993); 
Thompson et al (1989); and the references they contain. (Note, however, Hoem 
(1976) and Hoem et al. (1981), who make a similar point, and establish an 
interesting link between weighted least squares estimation for the intensities Fx 
and minimum chi-square estimation for the counts of births Bx.) Second, ARIMA 
models for the TFR or other summary indicators show the same defect, compare, 
for example, Knudsen et al. (1993); Bell (1997); and Lee (1993). Finally, 
predictions on the basis of such time-series models assume that the parameters 
of the model are given, whereas in reality these are only estimates, with 
corresponding confidence intervals. How serious are these omissions and 
assumptions? To what extent do they lead to smaller confidence intervals and 
prediction intervals? We have opted for an empirical analysis of this question, 
and compared the results reported in the previous sections with corresponding 
results based on traditional assumptions. Below we summarize our findings for 
three cases: predictions with known φ-matrix, unweighted Gamma curve 
estimates, and unweighted ARIMA model estimates. 
 
When the φ-matrix is known, simulation is unnecessary, and predictions for the 
TFR, the mean age, and the variance and corresponding prediction intervals can 
be computed analytically. We found that assuming the φ-matrix as given leads to 
95 per cent bounds for the TFR and the mean age in 2050 that are too narrow by 
8 per cent (0.5 child per woman) and 18 per cent (3.9 years), respectively. The 
95 per cent bounds of the variance are little affected.  
 
Unweighted Gamma curve estimates ignore the fact that low birth rates at young 
and old ages have small variances, and thus these rates should get more weight 
than high rates at intermediate ages. When rate variances are ignored, all 
weights wx in expression (3.4) are chosen equal to one. The consequence is that 
the estimated TFR becomes higher compared to the weighted case, since the 
fitted curve follows the high rates more closely. To what extent the mean age 
and the variance are influenced, is an empirical matter. Fitting the Gamma curve 
using unweighted least squares to the data for the years 1945-1995, we found 
that estimates for all three parameters are higher than in the weighted case in 
almost every year. The difference is very small after 1970, but larger between 
1945 and 1970, when the fit of the Gamma curve was somewhat less. In general, 
the results indicate that weighting has only had minor impact on the estimates 
for the TFR and the mean age, and a bit more for the variance in the first two 
decades after the war. However, the estimated parameter variances for the three 
parameters are relatively small in the unweighted case. This leads to narrow 
confidence intervals for many predicted age-specific rates. During the ages of 
high childbearing, the confidence intervals around the predicted age-specific 
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rates are nearly half as large in the unweighted case compared to the weighted 
case. For younger and older ages the differences are much smaller. 
 
Not only the birth rates, but also the three summary parameters are estimates, each 
with their own variance. We estimated a multivariate ARIMA (1,1,0) model for the 
three log-transformed parameters of interest. These parameters were computed on 
the basis of unweighted birth rates, and the ARIMA-model was estimated giving 
equal weights to the parameters in each year. The prediction intervals of such an 
“unweighted ARIMA-model” can be computed analytically, assuming that the 
estimated φ-matrix is the real one. We found a predicted TFR in 2050 which was 
almost the same as that in the weighted case, but the mean age, and particularly 
the variance increased to a higher equilibrium level. This is explained by the high 
estimates for φ22 (0.986, for the mean age) and φ32 (0.804, for the variance) that 
we obtained. The 95 per cent interval for the TFR is much narrower than in the 
weighted case (by 1.7 child in 2050), and that for the mean age a little so (by 
almost 4 years).10 The consequence of ignoring weights thus is that we are too 
optimistic about the future TFR, in the sense that the prediction intervals are too 
narrow. At the same time we are too pessimistic regarding the future variance in 
the age at childbearing. In traditional cohort-component forecasting an error in the 
TFR is more important for the number of births, and hence for the population at 
young ages, than an error in the variance.  If we would have ignored the sample 
variation in the historical age-specific birth rates in this particular empirical 
application, and also ignored the errors in the parameter estimates of the Gamma 
curve, we would have put too much confidence in subsequent births predictions. 
3.1.6. Comparison with historical TFR-errors 
Prediction intervals determine the expected errors in the current forecast. Investi-
gating observed errors in historical forecasts can provide an independent check of 
the expected errors. We have analysed the errors in twelve TFR-forecasts that 
Statistics Norway has published between 1969 and 1996. (Errors in the mean 
age or in the variance have not been computed, because the assumed values for 
these indicators in historical forecasts have not been documented.) Assumed 
TFR-values for each forecast from the jump-off year until 1999 were compared 
with “observed” values (moment estimators). We have updated the data 
originally assembled by Texmon (1992), who collected, among others, TFR 
errors for the forecasts of 1969-1987 during the years 1969-1989. Most forecasts 
had more than one fertility variant, often two or three. In that case we included 
all variants in the data, because none of the forecasts, except two, contained a 
clear advice as to which of the variants was considered by Statistics Norway as 
the most probable one at the time of publication. Hence it was left to the user to 
pick one of the variants. The exceptions were the 1993- and 1996-based 
                                                     
10 This empirical evidence is in line with theoretical results obtained by Koreisha and Fang (1999), who 
show that predictions generated by (univariate) ARMA models become more uncertain as a result of 
measurement errors, given certain conditions for the autocovariance function of the process. 
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forecasts, for which it was clearly indicated that the medium fertility variant was 
considered as more probable than the high or the low variant (Statistics Norway 
1994, 1997). However, users were also advised to investigate the consequences 
of choosing the other two variants as an input to their own plan or analysis. Only 
in case the user’s conclusions would depend little on the choice for the two 
extreme variants, the user was advised to employ the medium variant. Thus we 
may assume that all variants have been used for the forecasts published between 
1969 and 1996, although the middle one probably more often than the high or 
the low one (in case there were three variants). 
 
The error in the TFR was simply defined as the assumed minus the “observed” 
value. Hence a positive or negative error indicates a value that is too high or too 
low. We had 28 series of TFR errors, and each series was ordered by forecast 
duration (the jump-off year was defined as duration 0). For each duration, the 
errors were ordered from low (including negative values) to high. Finally we 
selected, by linear interpolation, if necessary, two error values, such that one-
sixth of the errors for each duration were lower, and one-sixth were higher than 
these values. Hence these two values can be interpreted as the bounds of an 
empirical 67 per cent “confidence” interval. Two out of three errors are within 
these bounds, and one-sixth of the errors is higher or lower. 
 
Figure 3.11 shows the bounds of the 67 per cent interval for the TFR errors, 
together with the mean and the median error. The lower bound is approximately –
0.2, close to zero. The error was larger than –0.2 in five out of every six cases was; 
most often it was positive. This reflects the fact that the strong fertility decline in 
the 1970s (see Figure 3.1) came as a surprise for Norwegian population fore-
casters, as was the case for demographers in many other Western countries. The 
distance between the mean or median error on the one hand, and the upper bound 
on the other, is larger than that between mean/median and lower bound, indi-
cating that large errors were more frequent than small ones in the historical fore-
casts. The width of the 67 per cent interval grows from 0.13 children per woman in 
the jump-off year to 1.1 at duration 15. The historical error in Figure 3.11 increase 
somewhat faster than the expected ones do. After 15 years into the forecast period, 
the 67 per cent prediction interval in Figure 3.10 is only 0.9 children wide, but the 
general agreement between the two types of error is rather good. Thus the analysis 
in this section supports the main conclusions concerning the width of the prediction 
TFR-intervals in Section 3.1.3, namely that rejecting TFR-values outside a range of 
[0.5-4.0] children per woman results in realistic intervals11. 
                                                     
11 One may argue that using historical errors as a check for expected errors is too pessimistic, since one 
ignores improvements in forecast methodology. Indeed, average errors for the forecasts made in the 
1980s are smaller than those for the forecasts from the 1970s. But this is to be expected, because the 
early forecasts are of longer duration, and hence more uncertain. When one wishes to estimate the 
average error in subsequent forecasts, controlling for this duration effect, a multivariate model is 
needed. An analysis of this kind carried out for Norwegian fertility forecasts showed very little improve-
ment over subsequent forecast rounds (Keilman 1997). Period effects dominate the error pattern. 
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Figure 3.11. Empirical errors in historical TFR-forecasts, forecasts 1969-1996, period 1969-
1999 
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3.2. Cohort fertility 
3.2.1. Introduction 
The predictions presented so far are pure period predictions. This is in line with 
the current literature on stochastic forecasts and related topics. Compare, for 
instance, the period TFR predictions by Thompson et al. (1989) and Bell (1992) 
for the US 1984-2020, Lee (1993) and Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) for the US 
1990-2065, Hanika et al. (1997) and Lutz and Scherbov (1998a) for Austria 
1996-2010, and (1998b) for Germany 1995-2030, and finally Alho (1998) for 
Finland 1998-2050. Little is known, however, regarding the intervals for the 
cohort analogue of the TFR, i.e. the Completed Cohort Fertility (CCF). On the 
one hand, the CCF often displays a smoother time trend than the TFR (Akers 
1965, 417). Therefore one might assume that it is easier to predict the CCF than 
the TFR (De Beer, 1992), which suggests that the CCF prediction interval is 
relatively narrow. But on the other hand, it takes some 30 years after women 
had their first child, before they complete childbearing. Hence current young 
cohorts display massive incomplete data problems, and this would tend to widen 
the intervals. 
 
There are various ways of predicting the CCF. The starting point is a table of 
empirical age-specific fertility rates for a number of years. The time series of 
empirical CCFs may be modelled directly by univariate ARIMA methods. This 
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ignores the information contained in fertility rates for young cohorts in recent 
years. De Beer (1985) identifies and fits a so-called Cohort ARIMA (CARIMA) 
model to the table of fertility rates. The method combines two ARIMA models: 
one in the age direction, and one in the cohort direction. Next De Beer 
extrapolates age-specific fertility rates. Willekens and Baydar (1984) fit an age-
period-cohort model (APC model) to the fertility table, and extrapolate the 
period and the cohort effects separately. They estimate age effects, and assume 
that these are constant over time. Combining extrapolated period effects and 
cohort effects, together with the constant age effects results in predicted fertility 
rates by age. Thompson et al. (1989) use a multivariate ARIMA model for the 
three parameters of a gamma curve describing the age pattern of period fertility.  
 
Although none of the authors mentioned here addressed this issue, the CCF 
could have been found simply by rearranging extrapolated fertility rates by birth 
cohort. This is the method adopted in this Section, which elaborates on the 
approach adopted by Thompson et al. More specifically, of the four sources of 
variance mentioned in Section 3.1, we will not only take the residual variance in 
the time series model into account (as is usually done), but also the other three. 
 
This Section presents findings for prediction intervals of Norwegian cohort 
fertility. Section 3.2.2 shows such intervals obtained by rearranging predicted 
age specific fertility rates from a period to a cohort perspective, on the basis of 
unrestricted period fertility simulations. In Section 3.2.3 cohort patterns are 
explored with restricted period fertility. Finally, Section 3.2.4 compares the high 
and low cohort fertility assumptions from the 1996-based population forecast by 
Statistics Norway with the prediction intervals. 
3.2.2. Prediction intervals for cohort fertility 
Age-specific fertility rates predicted for the years 1996-2050 (see Section 3.1) 
were complemented with observed rates for the period 1900 to 1995, and the 
whole array of age-specific rates from 1900 to 2050 was rearranged by birth 
cohort. This led to one time-series for the CCF and other cohort fertility 
indicators - partly observed, and partly extrapolated. The process was repeated 
for each of the 5 000 simulations described in Section 3.1. Figure 3.12 gives the 
prediction intervals for the CCF. These are based on the unrestricted period 
fertility simulations reported in Section 3.1.2. CCF-prediction intervals based on 
restricted period fertility simulations will be reported in Section 3.2.3. 
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Figure 3.12. Completed Cohort Fertility. Birth cohorts 1900-2000 
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First, note that the mean value for the CCF is almost constant at 2.1 children per 
woman for cohorts born after 1960. Second, the CCF displays, on the long run, 
prediction intervals of the same width as those for the period TFR in Figure 3.5, 
provided one takes the different time scales into account. For instance, the two-
thirds CCF-interval for women born in the year 2000 ranges from 1.19 to 2.94 
children per woman. This agrees closely with the bounds of the TFR-interval in 
the year 2030, the year in which those women will attain their mean age at 
childbearing: 1.19 and 2.90. The difference between Figures 3.5 and 3.12, how-
ever, concerns the intervals for the birth generations of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Still comparing CCF-intervals for women born in a given year with TFR-intervals 
30 years later, we see that the CCF-interval for women born in the mid-1960s is 
three times as wide as that for the TFR in the mid-1990s. But the widths con-
verge quickly for younger cohorts and later years: 25 per cent wider for cohorts 
born around 1970, compared to years around 2000, and only 10 per cent wider 
for cohorts born around 1980/years around 201012.  
 
The TFRs before 1996 in Figure 3.5 were not extrapolated, but estimated on the 
basis of observed data up to 1995. Hence prediction intervals for years up to 
                                                     
12 If we shift the two time scales over a period of 28 years, instead of 30, the differences between 
Figures 3.5 and 3.12 remain essentially the same. Yet initial differences are larger, but on the long 
run the two intervals still have the same width. 
Norway's Uncertain Demographic Future Social and Economic Studies 105 
42 
1995 are negligibly narrow: there is very little uncertainty due to estimation. But 
at the same time, the CCF for cohorts born before 1996-30=1966 is still a bit 
uncertain, which is reflected in the prediction intervals for those cohorts in 
Figure 3.12. For example, the 67 per cent interval is 0.01 children wide for 
women born in 1954. This reflects the fact that these women had not yet entirely 
completed their childbearing in 1995, when they were 41 years old. Younger co-
horts had more years to go in 1995, and hence the intervals become increasingly 
wider: the 67 per cent interval is 0.08 for cohort 1960, and 0.26 children per 
woman for women born in 1965. It takes the CCF interval some 16 years to grow 
from 0.1 to 1.0 children wide - uncertainty in the TFR grows over the same range 
during a shorter period: 13 years. 
 
In summary, we can say that on the long run, the CCF is as uncertain as the TFR, 
but the uncertainty in the CCF starts earlier, and therefore increases slower than 
that in the TFR. This is a mere reflection of the fact that as time goes by, more 
and more young birth cohorts are exposed to the risk of childbearing over a 
longer span of their reproductive life. 
 
 
Figure 3.13. CCF, 95 per cent prediction interval, minimum TFR=0 
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Figure 3.14. CCF, 67 per cent prediction interval, minimum TFR=0 
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3.2.3. CCF-prediction intervals when the period TFR is restricted 
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show how the prediction intervals for the Completed 
Cohort Fertility change when we select various limits for the period TFR.  Again 
we see that a TFR ceiling equal to 3 children per woman would lead to a slight 
decrease in the upper 67 per cent and 95 per cent bounds, which is unreason-
able. Selecting a maximum TFR of 4 or 5 children per woman gives a more 
realistic pattern. Note that the slight fall in the upper bound after birth cohort 
2005 is an anomaly in the simulations: the simulations stop in the year 2050, so 
that cohorts born in 2000 or later are progressively truncated at their higher 
ages. As with the period TFR, the width of the 67 per cent interval on the short 
run changes relatively little when the maximum TFR is increased from 4 to 5 
children. 
 
Prediction intervals based on a minimum TFR equal to 1 are a bit narrower than 
those in Figures 3.13 and 3.14, in particular because the lower bounds of the 
intervals are lifted up.  
3.2.4. A comparison with CCF-assumptions in Statistics Norway’s   
   population forecast 
How do the CCF prediction intervals compare with the high and the low variants 
for cohort fertility in the 1996-based population forecast of Statistics Norway? In 
that forecast, the year 2010 was chosen as the target year for fertility, that is, the 
year after which no change was assumed for fertility parameters. During the 
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years 1996-2010, the period TFR was assumed to be more or less constant at a 
level of between 1.7 and 2.1 children per woman, while a further increase in the 
mean age was foreseen from 28.8 years in 1995 to 29.5-30.5 years, see Table 3.4 
in Section 3.1.3.  
 
Figure 3.15 shows the CCF assumed by Statistics Norway, together with 
prediction intervals obtained by simulation. We notice that for cohorts born after 
1975, no more than about 20 per cent of the simulations were covered by the 
official high-low intervals. In other words, the expected probability that the 
future CCF will fall between the margins defined by Statistics Norway is only one 
out of five. The corresponding probability for the (unrestricted) period TFR is a 
bit higher, but still very low: only 29 per cent in the year 2010.  
 
Thus we see that Norwegian forecasters have been quite optimistic when they 
assumed so narrow bounds between the low and the high fertility variants in the 
official forecast. One may argue that this conclusion is a consequence of the fact 
that the prediction intervals in Figures 3.5, 3.12, and 3.15 are far too wide. 
However, as mentioned in Section 3.1, independent evidence in the form of 
errors in historical TFR-forecasts supports the prediction intervals for the period 
TFR, at least to the year 2010. 
 
 
Figure 3.15. Completed cohort fertility, assumed in Statistics Norway's 1996 forecast (CCFL 
 and CCFH), and prediction intervals 
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Hence the interval defined by the high and low CCF-variants in Statistics 
Norway’s population forecast of 1996 had an expected accuracy of no more than 
approximately 20 per cent, given our model. Is this conclusion affected by the 
choice of the maximum TFR values in the model? We found that the width of the 
20 per cent prediction interval changes very little, when the maximum TFR value 
is set to 4 or 5 children per woman, as compared to the virtually unrestricted 
TFR simulations in Figures 3.13 and 3.14. Selected results are given in Table 3.5. 
For birth cohort 2000, the interval becomes 0.34-0.38 children wide, when a 
maximum TFR of 4-5 is chosen. This is somewhat less than the width of 0.42 
children per woman for the 20 per cent interval in Figure 3.15. In other words, 
the expected accuracy of the official high-low interval is somewhat higher than 
20 per cent, but still very limited. This may be one of the reasons why the high-
low TFR interval was changed to [1.5-2.1] in the 1999-forecast of Statistics 
Norway.  
 
 
Table 3.5. Width of 20 per cent prediction intervals for the CCF 
 TFR<10 TFR<5 TFR<4 
Cohort    
1970 0.14 0.12 0.12 
1980 0.28 0.25 0.24 
1990 0.37 0.32 0.31 
2000 0.42 0.38 0.34 
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4. Mortality 
4.1. The approach in general 
Prediction intervals for death rates by age and sex were obtained on the basis of 
the following method. 
• Death probabilities for ages 0, 1, 2, … 100 by sex for the years 1945-1995 
were taken from Mamelund and Borgan (1996). We assumed that these 
probabilities were generated by a first order homogeneous Markov process 
with constant mortality intensity over each one-year age interval. 
• The predictions consisted of three steps.  
• First, a life table calculation resulted in annual values of the life expectancy 
at birth for men and women for the period 1945-1995. The two time series 
of life expectancies were modelled by means of a bivariate ARIMA model, 
and stochastic simulation resulted in prediction intervals for male and 
female life expectancies for the period 1996-2050. Section 4.2 gives details. 
• Second, we assumed that for each year the historical age pattern of 
mortality could be described by means of a Heligman-Pollard (H-P) curve. 
This is a mathematical function with eight parameters, see Section 4.3. 
This resulted in two time series of parameter estimates for the years 1945-
1995, one for each sex. The time series were modelled by means of 
multivariate time series models of the ARIMA-type. Stochastic simulation 
yielded 5 000 multivariate sample paths for the parameters for the period 
1996-2050. The H-P curve was used to transform the parameter 
predictions back into future age-specific mortality rates. For each year in 
the prediction period, a life table calculation summarized those rates into 
one indicator, viz. the life expectancy at birth. These life expectancies were 
assembled in a look-up table, together with the underlying H-P parameter 
values.  
• In the third and final step, H-P parameter values and age/sex-specific death 
rates from the look-up table were assigned to life expectancy values for 
each sample path, predicted in the first step, by matching life expectancy 
values from the first and the second step, controlling for calendar year and 
sex. 
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In a trial calculation, the death rates that resulted from the H-P extrapolations in 
step 2 were directly employed in the stochastic cohort component simulations. 
This, however, led to unacceptably large prediction intervals for the life 
expectancy at birth. For instance, in 2050, the 95 per cent interval was 12.2 
years for men and 19.1 years for women (4.5 and 9.4 years for the 67 per cent 
intervals). At the same time we obtained correlation coefficients between male 
and female mortality (as measured by the correlations of estimates for time 
series coefficients for corresponding H-P-parameters for men and women) of 
between 5 and 15 per cent this way. This indicated an unrealistically weak 
correlation between the sexes. On the other hand, by predicting the life 
expectancy at birth directly, the 95 per cent intervals became narrower, and 
correlations across the sexes increased considerably, see below. Thus, the direct 
predictions of the life expectancy were accepted, and step 3 above was used to 
assign age-specific death rates to the life expectancy values of step 2. By the 
nature of the approach, the correlation across time of H-P parameters and age-
specific death probabilities was not preserved. Therefore, these correlations were 
checked for death probabilities, by comparing one-step ahead autocorrelations 
for selected ages as observed in the historical data with similar autocorrelations 
computed for the simulations. Details will be given in Section 4.3. 
4.2. A multivariate ARIMA model for the life expectancy at birth 
The following ARIMA (2,0,0) model was estimated for the log of male and 
female life expectancies for the period 1945-1995. 
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Parameter estimates are given in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Parameter estimates for model (4.1). Estimated standard errors in parentheses 
 φ1 φ2 K
Men 0.9518 0.0488 -0.00145
 (0.0998) (0.0999)
Women 0.9089 0.0918 -0.00247
 (0.1146) (0.1147)
 
 
The φ2-estimates for men and women were not significantly different from zero. 
Yet these have been retained in order to avoid autocorrelation in the residual. 
The constant vector (KM,KF) was not estimated, but computed directly. To begin 
with, model (4.1) did not contain a constant - in other words, (KM,KF) was equal 
to the null vector. Predictions to 2050 resulted in values for the life expectancy 
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that were much higher than those used by Statistics Norway in its population 
forecast: model (4.1) predicted 86.7 years for men and 95.8 years for women, 
whereas the official values are 80 and 84.5 years, respectively. Therefore, the 
null vector was adjusted in such a way that model (4.1) gave the official 
predictions in 2050. The adjustment method, which is a variant of Lee’s (1993) 
method for univariate ARIMA models, is described in Appendix 4.1.  
 
The correlation between corresponding φ-estimates for men and women turned 
out to be 45 per cent, both for φ1 and φ2. We also experimented with a bivariate 
ARIMA (1,1,0) model for the log of the life expectancies, and found a correlation 
of φ-estimates across the sexes equal to 62 per cent. (This model was rejected, 
because it left too much autocorrelation in the residuals for women.)  Although 
the real correlation across the sexes for mortality is not known13, these values 
seem to be much more reasonable than those obtained on the basis of φ-matrices 
for the H-P parameters (5-15 per cent, see above). This gives further support to 
modelling life expectancies directly, instead of deriving future life expectancy 
values from predicted H-P parameters. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Prediction intervals for life expectancy at birth. Men 
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13 Alho (1998) estimates for mortality in Finland in the period 1900-1994 a correlation of 80 per 
cent between male and female age-specific death rates. 
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Figure 4.2. Prediction intervals for life expectancy at birth. Women 
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025 2035 2045
Observed
95% High
80% High
67% High
50 %
67% Low
80% Low
95% Low
 
 
 
Prediction intervals for the life expectancy at birth by sex are shown in Figures 
4.1 and 4.2. These are obtained on the basis of 5 000 simulations, in which the 
φ1-matrix, the φ2-matrix and the ε-vector were treated as multivariate normal 
variables with known means and covariances, and the K-vector was assumed 
fixed. The latter assumption implies that the prediction intervals for the life 
expectancy are too narrow, but we do not know by how much. On the other 
hand, in Section 4.5 we shall see that the intervals are wider than what could be 
expected on the basis of empirical errors in forecasts since 1969. Therefore it was 
decided to accept the intervals as displayed in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
The 95 per cent intervals appear to be 11.1 (men) and 12.2 (women) years wide in 
2050. In both cases this implies a relative width (compared to the median value) of 
14 per cent. The correlation between male and female life expectancy turns out to 
be 0.50 in 2050, decreasing from 0.63 in 1996, 0.56 in 2010 and 0.51 in 2030. 
 
Excess mortality of men, compared to women, is likely to decrease further in the 
future. In the period 1991-1995, the life expectancy at birth for men was 6 years 
lower than that for women, a slight reduction compared to the difference of 6.8 
years which was observed in the mid-1980s. In 2010, the gap is reduced to an 
expected 5.7 years (the 95 per cent prediction interval for this difference equals 
(3.3, 8.0)), and it drops further to 5.2 years in 2030 (1.1, 9.4) and 4.7 years in 
2050 (-1.3, 10.7). The lower bound of the 95 per cent interval falls below zero in 
2040, implying a 2.5 per cent chance for higher female than male mortality. 
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In 1999 Statistics Norway published its most recent population forecast, in which 
it is assumed that the life expectancy of men will increase from 75.5 in 1999 to 
between 77 and 83 years in 2050, and for women from 81.2 to 81.5-87.5 years. 
Assuming that our model is correct, we can predict the expected accuracy of the 
official life expectancy forecasts. In 2050, this accuracy turns out to be 64 per 
cent for men, and 62 per cent for women. For both sexes, it is much lower in the 
beginning of this century (36 per cent in 2010 for men, and 35 per cent for 
women in 2000) but increases steadily to the 2050-values. 
 
The fact that we accounted for estimation variance of the matrices φ1 and φ2, and 
not only the residual εt, had a stronger effect for women than for men. For 
instance, when the matrices are assumed as given and only the residual is 
stochastic, the 95 per cent prediction interval for the male life expectancy in 
2050 is 9.5 years wide – compare this value with the interval of 11.1 years 
assuming stochastic φ-matrices. For women the interval becomes 9.2 years wide 
in 2050 (12.2 years with stochastic φ-matrices). 
 
Our results indicate similar uncertainty for the life expectancy at birth as that 
estimated by De Beer and Alders (1999) for the case of the Netherlands. These 
authors modelled the time series of life expectancies for the two sexes separately 
based on a random walk with drift, and found a 95 per cent prediction interval 
of 12 years wide in 2050, both for men and for women. 
 
Intervals presented by Tuljapurkar et al (2000) for the G7 countries (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are 
much smaller than ours are. Their 90 per cent intervals of combined-sex life 
expectancy at birth in 2050 range from a minimum of 2.8 years for Canada to a 
maximum of 7.5 years for the UK. These intervals are based on a one-parameter 
Lee-Carter model for age-specific mortality for the two sexes combined. The 
single parameter was modelled as a random walk with drift. The authors used an 
abridged life table with five-year age classes up to 80-84. Ages 85 years and 
higher were lumped into one age class (except for Japan). The age and sex 
aggregation, which reduces random fluctuations, may have caused these 
relatively narrow intervals. 
4.3. The Heligman-Pollard curve 
Demographers, statisticians and actuaries have long been occupied with finding a 
suitable "law of mortality", i.e. a mathematical representation of age-specific 
mortality - most often (but not exclusively) in terms of the death rates. A large 
number of such laws have been proposed, a process that started with De Moivre 
in 1725, and that continues until the present day (Hannerz 2001). For a recent 
review, see Tabeau (2001). Some of the laws are restricted to adult or old age 
mortality (Coale-Kisker, Himes-Preston-Condran, Gompertz, Perks, Weibull). 
Tabeau (2001) and Boleslawski and Tabeau (2001) compare some 27 of such laws. 
Relational models, such as Brass' logit model, and the Lee-Carter model, are also 
considered. Among the laws and models, the Heligman-Pollard curve is widely 
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applied (Rogers and Gard 1991; McNown and Rogers 1989; Hartmann 1987; 
Kostaki 1992a,b). Compared to other models, the H-P curve has the advantage that 
it pairs accuracy in prediction with flexibility, in particular when describing mortali-
ty changes over time. Hartmann (1987) used Swedish mortality data for the period 
1900-1970, and concluded that the H-P curve is a useful model for making popula-
tion projections, one reason being the fact that it accommodates for changing age 
patterns of mortality as the level of mortality changes. 
 
We have used the following formula for the Heligman-Pollard curve 
(4.2) 
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where qx is the one-year probability of dying at age x, and the eight parameters 
A-H are to be estimated from the data (Heligman and Pollard 1980). The three 
terms model childhood mortality (A,B,C), the accident hump (D,E,F), and adult 
through old age mortality (G,H). Since B is very small for developed countries 
(indeed, we found after some experimentation that it could be put equal to zero 
for the case of Norway), A effectively represents infant mortality, and C the rate 
of decline of child mortality. F is the locality of the accident hump, E its spread (a 
large E reflects a narrow hump), and D its severity. The third term is a modified 
Gompertz curve, which decelerates at higher ages. G is the base level and H the 
increase in adult mortality. 
 
Estimation was carried out by means of Relative Least Squares, using the 
Marquardt estimation method. We minimized the sum  
 
∑ −
x
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x
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qˆ
q
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with xqˆ the empirical probability. The Marquardt method requires first deriva-
tives of expression (4.2) with respect to the unknown parameters. These were 
calculated by means of the program MAPLE. Ages 0, 98, 99 and 100 were treated 
differently14. 
                                                     
14 Since the estimate of B was found to be zero, q0 cannot be estimated on the basis of the HP-curve, not 
even when we restrict ourselves to the first term for childhood mortality: in that case q0 would invaria-
bly be equal to one. Therefore we used a different procedure, and assumed simply that q0,t ≈ qα,t-1. For 
men we found that α=0.1100 fitted the data well, and for women α=0.3715. Empirical qx-values for  
x ≥ 98 are highly irregular. Therefore these were not included in the curve fitting exercise. Predicted 
values for ages 98 and 99 are based on age-extrapolations of the HP-curve, fitted for ages 1-97. For age 
x=100, the cohort-component method requires a death probability for the open age group 100+. This 
probability was set equal to 0.5 for men and women in each year. For the life tables, q100 was set equal 
to 1. 
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We met considerable difficulties when estimating the parameters. Often the 
algorithm did not converge, or resulted in estimates that were dependent upon 
the initial values. Fitting the curve not to the original series of empirical 
probabilities xqˆ , but to a three-term moving average of that series in the age 
dimension solved this problem. Indeed, few of the earlier applications of the HP-
curve have successfully applied probabilities for one-year age groups and single 
calendar years. Some averaging over time, in the age dimension, or both seems 
to be necessary, compare Heligman and Pollard (1980), Kostaki (1992a,b), Bell 
(1997), and the references therein. For an exception, see Tabeau et al. (1999). 
 
The initial value for each parameter was found by splitting the curve up into 
three parts, and estimating them separately (for each year and sex): 
 
• 
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After some experimentation we found that the starting values obtained this way 
for the year 1995 could serve as starting values for the whole curve during the 
entire period. The fit for women at high ages was unsatisfactory. In many years, 
predicted rates for ages 80 or higher were lower than empirical rates. Therefore 
the third part of the curve was replaced by a pure Gompertz curve (GHx), so that 
formula (4.2) for women reads  
 
(4.3) x2
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x GH)Flogx(logEexpDAq +


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Expression (4.3) gave a satisfactory fit for women for all years. In the following, 
when we refer to the Heligman-Pollard curve, we refer to expression (4.2) for 
men and expression (4.3) for women (with B=0 and E=1, see below). 
 
The estimate for the parameter B turned out to be insignificant at the 5 per cent 
level, both for women and for men. Hence this parameter was set equal to zero 
for the whole period. For women, the estimate of E was close to one for many 
years, and hence was fixed at that value. This left us with seven parameters for 
men, and six for women. 
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4.4. A multivariate ARIMA model for the parameters of the 
Heligman-Pollard curve 
The result of the calculations reported in Section 4.3 was a series of estimates 
ttttttt Hˆ,Gˆ,Fˆ,Eˆ,Dˆ,Cˆ,Aˆ  for men, and tttttt Hˆ,Gˆ,Fˆ,Dˆ,Cˆ,Aˆ  for women, together 
with their estimated covariance matrices tΩˆ , t = 1945, …, 1995. 
 
The next step was to fit a multivariate ARIMA model to the time series of (log-
transformed) parameters. A (1,1,0) model was found to fit well. For men, the 
model can be written as  
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or t1tt ZZ εΨ += −  for short. tAlog∇  represents the first difference 
1tt AˆAˆ −−  log log . tε is assumed to be a multivariate white noise process 
),(N εΣ0 . For women, the model is similar, except that rows and columns for 
the parameter E are not included. Note that the model contains an intercept term 
(constants KA, … , KH), as opposed to the fertility model in Chapter 3. The reason 
is that we want to allow the life expectancy to increase for the whole projection 
period up to 2050. 
 
Estimation of the Φij-coefficients was done in various steps. First, for each sex the 
full matrix was estimated by Ordinary Least Squares.15 Next, in order to keep the 
number of estimates to a minimum, most of the estimates that were not signifi-
cant at the 5 per cent level were set equal to zero, and the model was re-
estimated using Restricted Least Squares.16 After that, initial projections were 
made for the parameters A-H up to 2050, and these were converted into age-
                                                     
15 This means that correlation across the sexes in the age pattern of mortality was ignored. It is, 
however, included in the life expectancy.  
16 In case none of the estimates for a certain parameter (A-H) was significant, the corresponding 
estimate on the main diagonal of Ψ was retained. Estimates for the constants KA-KH were retained as 
much as possible, with a view to the adjustment method to be described below. 
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specific probabilities of dying and life tables. Finally the constants KA-KH were 
adjusted (using the method of Appendix 4.1) such that the resulting adjusted life 
table in 2050 predicted a life expectancy at birth of 84.5 years for women and 80 
years for men. Table 4.2 gives the estimates for the non-zero elements of the Ψ-
matrices for men and women.  
 
Model predictions for the HP-parameters showed that the level parameters for 
childhood mortality (A), adolescent mortality (D), and adult mortality (G) are 
likely to fall further. For men, the reductions in A and G are stronger than that in 
D, so that expected age-specific mortality up to 2030 still shows a slight accident 
hump. More detailed information will be given in the next section. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Estimates of non-zero elements of the Ψ-matrices for men and women, and 
corresponding standard errors. K-estimates in parentheses are adjusted for e0-
target value 
 Men  Women 
 Estimate Standard error  Estimate Standard error 
ΦAA -0.616 0.064  -0.436 0.096 
ΦCC -0.549 0.074  -0.509 0.077 
ΦDD -0.238 0.107  -0.542 0.089 
ΦEE -0.644 0.073  - - 
ΦFF -0.398 0.094  -0.744 0.117 
ΦGG -0.412 0.071  - - 
ΦHH -0.439 0.071  -0.454 0.125 
ΦAD - -  0.093 0.028 
ΦDA - -  0.526 0.222 
ΦFA 0.110 0.037  - - 
ΦFC -0.130 0.049  - - 
ΦFD 0.056 0.026  - - 
ΦFG - -   0.391 0.150 
ΦHF - -  -0.004 0.001 
ΦHG - -  -0.005 0.002 
KA -0.073
(-0.275) 
0.013  -0.054
(-0.028) 
0.011 
KC -
(-3.17E-8) 
-   -
(-2.97E-7) 
- 
KD -0.021
(-0.080) 
0.019  -
(1.11E-4) 
- 
KE 0.035
(0.132) 
0.036  - - 
KF -
(-0.000) 
-  -
(2.3E-5) 
- 
KG -0.003
(-0.010) 
0.003  -0.013
(-0.007) 
0.007 
KH -
(2.54E-8) 
-  -
(-2.05E-7) 
- 
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Table 4.3. Autocorrelation in death probabilities for selected age/sex combinations 
 Simulations 1996-2050  
 Mean Median 
2.5% and 97.5% 
percentiles 
 
Observed 
1945-1995 
Men      
Age 1 0.815 0.819 (0.726, 0.885)   0.859 
Age 25 0.538 0.578 (0.193, 0.757)   0.513 
Age 50 0.503 0.562 (0.003, 0.843)   0.448 
Age 75 0.690 0.823 (0.057, 0.937)   0.595 
Age 99 0.304 0.299 (-0.073, 0.676)  -0.026 
Women      
Age 1 0.815 0.819 (0.726, 0.885)   0.875 
Age 25 0.079 0.068 (-0.159, 0.357)   0.793 
Age 50 0.314 0.320 (-0.050, 0.656)   0.690 
Age 75 0.683 0.787 (0.161, 0.928)   0.889 
Age 99 0.167 0.149 (-0.164, 0.551)   0.504 
 
At ages 1-10, predicted death probabilities for girls were almost invariably higher 
than those for boys. This is explained by the fact that in the period 1980-1995, the 
parameter A falls more steeply for boys than for girls. Consequently the ARIMA 
model, which puts much weight on recent observations, predicts a steeper fall in 
the A-parameter for boys than for girls, which in turn causes lower death probabili-
ties for boys. This was considered unrealistic, and therefore we decided to reduce 
girls’ probabilities to the level of those for boys for ages 1-10, in those simulations 
where girls in this age group would have higher mortality than boys. The latter 
turned out to be the case in virtually all simulations. An experimental calculation 
showed that this ad hoc correction of female mortality would result in a life 
expectancy that is higher by 0.1 years at most, which was considered acceptable.  
 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, by the nature of the approach we have adopted for 
mortality simulation, the correlation across time of H-P parameters and age-
specific death probabilities was not preserved in the simulations. Therefore, this 
correlation was checked for death probabilities, by comparing one-step ahead 
autocorrelations for selected ages as observed in the historical data with similar 
autocorrelations computed for the simulations. Each simulation results in one 
autocorrelation value, given sex and age. Table 4.3 gives summary statistics for 
the autocorrelations in the simulations, as well as historical values. 
 
The table shows that the historical autocorrelation structure for male mortality is 
rather well preserved in the simulations, while the autocorrelation values for 
females generally are low compared to historical values.17 This means that 
simulated death probabilities for women vary somewhat stronger over time than 
historical probabilities did. For the life expectancy however, the historical 
autocorrelation structure was preserved, by the very use of model (4.1). 
                                                     
17 At age 1, the autocorrelation does not differ between the sexes, for the reason described earlier in 
this section. 
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4.5. Prediction intervals for age and sex specific mortality 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate how the age pattern of mortality and the prediction 
intervals around the death probabilities will change over the years. For men, the 
accident hump disappears between 2010 and 2030, while for women this is 
already the case in the years before 2010. The reason for irregular mortality for 
women around age 10 has been explained in the previous section. The 
probabilities involved are very low. Note that prediction intervals are wider for 
women than for men, which can be attributed to a relatively good fit of the 
ARIMA-model for the male H-P parameters. Table 4.2 shows that the time-series 
model for the parameters A and H in particular are more satisfactory for men 
than for women. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that the intervals narrow when age 
increases, but this is an artefact of the logarithmic scale. Except for some 
irregularities at the lowest ages, intervals become wider at more advanced ages. 
For instance, in 2050, the 95 per cent interval widens regularly from a minimum 
of 7.3E-5 (at age 1, both sexes) to 0.25 for men and 0.30 for women, both at age 
99.18 
 
The results in this section are based on stochastic simulation, in which both the 
distribution of the residual εt and that of the coefficient matrix Ψ were taken into 
account. This approach acknowledges uncertainty sources 3 and 4 mentioned in 
Section 2.2. However, in contrast to the fertility simulations, sources 1 and 2 
were not considered in the mortality simulations. More specifically, when model 
(4.4) was estimated, the annual values for the Heligman-Pollard parameters A-H 
were treated as data. In reality, these values are estimates, and their precision 
varies over time. When model (4.4) is estimated, years in which the covariances 
for parameters A-H are large should get less weight, compared with years in 
which covariances are low. This can be achieved by Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS) estimation of (4.4), with weights equal to the inverse of the square root of 
the covariance matrix. But predictions for the year 2050 of the parameters A-H 
based on an ARIMA model estimated by WLS gave unrealistically high values for 
parameters C, F, and H, both for men and women. The reason is that the 
covariance matrix of the estimates A-H is extremely unbalanced. In turn, this 
leads to an unbalanced matrix of weights: for women in 1995, for instance, the 
weights range from 0.0012 for G, to 741 for H. Therefore, model (4.4) was 
estimated with OLS. The consequence of ignoring uncertainty sources 1 and 2 is 
that prediction intervals in this section are too narrow – although it is unknown 
by how much. 
                                                     
18 The relative intervals become narrower when age increases.  
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Figure 4.3. Death probabilities for selected years and corresponding prediction intervals. 
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Figure 4.4. Death probabilities for selected years and corresponding prediction intervals. 
Women 
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4.6. Comparison with historical errors in the life expectancy 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 summarize empirical errors for extrapolated life expectancy 
of men and women. Eleven forecasts with base years between 1969 and 1996 
were analysed in a way similar to that described in Section 3.1.7 for the TFR. 
Extrapolated life expectancy values were compared with observed values for the 
years 1969-1999. The figures show mean and median errors that become 
increasingly more negative for longer forecast durations. Hence Norwegian 
forecasters have been too pessimistic, in that they assumed too low life 
expectancy values in past forecasts. After 15 years, life expectancies were too low 
by two years on average, both for men and for women. The empirical 67 per cent 
interval is much wider for women than for men, reflecting the unexpectedly 
strong improvement in female mortality since 1969. Quite remarkable is the fact 
that the intervals do not widen with increasing projection length. This is 
explained by the extrapolation method for life expectancy. For forecasts made 
between 1969 and 1982, no improvement in mortality was foreseen, and life 
expectancy was kept constant at its most recently observed value.19 In reality life 
expectancy increased more or less regularly. The consequence is that life 
expectancy errors show a time path for subsequent forecasts, which runs parallel 
to that of the mean error.  
 
Because of the limited number of empirical errors, the intervals are somewhat 
irregular. Yet it is not unreasonable to say that at durations of 10-15 years, the 
67 per cent interval is approximately 0.7 years wide for men, and roughly 1.8 
years for women. Thus prediction intervals in Section 4.2 are wider than 
historical intervals, and this empirical evidence would imply that one should 
restrict the life expectancy predictions of Section 4.2 to narrower bounds. On the 
other hand, these bounds should have been wider, if we would have been able to 
take estimation errors for the constant vector (KM,KF) into account, see Section 
4.2. Moreover, bounds around age- and sex-specific death rates should have been 
wider than what we could obtain, since sample variation in the historical age-
specific rates and estimation errors in H-P parameters could not be included in 
the models. For these reasons we decided to accept the life expectancy 
predictions of Section 4.2. 
 
 
                                                     
19 For the forecast of 1982, life expectancy was kept constant beginning in 1991. 
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Figure 4.5. Empirical errors in life expectancy forecasts for men. 1969-1999 
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Figure 4.6. Empirical errors in life expectancy forecasts for women. 1969-1999 
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Appendix 4.1. An adjustment method for the intercept of the 
multivariate time series model 
The purpose of the adjustment is to predict a pre-specified value for the life 
expectancy at birth in 2050, on the basis of the multivariate ARIMA (2,0,0) 
model given in expression (4.1).  
 
Rewrite model (4.1) in state-space form as 
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or Wt=C+ΦWt-1+εt for short. Thus Wt is a vector with log-transformed life 
expectancies by sex at times t and t-1, C is a vector of constants, and Φ is a 
matrix of coefficients. Taking expected values, and given C and Φ, the l-step 
ahead forecast for Wt is  
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For the actual computations, we selected t=1995, and l=55. Starting values 
W1995 were known from the life tables. Estimates for the matrix Φ were as in 
Table 4.2 (omitting the K-estimates). The target values for the life expectancies 
were 84.5 years for women, and 80 years for men, both to be reached in 2050.  
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5. Migration 
5.1. The approach in general 
Of the three components of population change, international migration is the 
one for which uncertainty is largest, because unforeseen economic, political, and 
legal developments, both at the national and the international level have a strong 
effect on this component. Few attempts have been reported to model immigra-
tion and emigration as a stochastic process. Alho and Spencer (1995) propose to 
model the error of age-specific migration by defining correction factors that 
modify age-specific survival rates, to account for migration. They distinguish 
between immigration and emigration, and discuss the correlation between 
emigration errors and immigration errors. De Beer (1997) reports on the 
experiences with time series models for immigration and total emigration to and 
from the Netherlands over the period 1960-1994. Both for immigration and for 
emigration, an ARIMA (1,0,0)-model was fitted; net-migration was best 
described by an ARIMA (0,0,1)-model. The long-term predictions for the fitted 
models for immigration and emigration corresponded rather closely with the 
long-term net migration prediction. The net migration model was quite stable 
when fitted to the three periods 1960-1980, 1960-1985, and 1960-1990. Alho 
(1998) fitted an ARIMA (0,1,1) model to the logarithms of immigration and 
emigration for Finland, 1945-1995. 
 
Numbers of migrations to and from Norway are modest relative to the resident 
population, even in those age classes where migration is most frequent. For this 
reason, and because of the largely unpredictable nature of migration, we have 
adopted an extremely simple approach for the computation of prediction inter-
vals for immigration and emigration. Separate procedures were adopted for the 
level and the age pattern of migration. First, two time series models were 
estimated on the basis of gross flow data for the period 1958-1997, one for 
immigration and one for emigration. These were adjusted in such a way that 
they predicted the same migration flows as those used by Statistics Norway in its 
latest official population forecast. Next, both flows were broken down by sex, 
using male/female shares as observed in recent years. Finally, each of the four 
flows was broken down into one-year age groups on the basis of age-specific 
shares. The latter shares were found by means of simple extrapolations of the 
Social and Economic Studies 105 Norway's Uncertain Demographic Future 
 63 
parameters of Rogers-Castro age schedules as estimated for the years 1967-1997. 
Observed errors in net migration for historical forecasts do not show any sensible 
pattern. Therefore these errors are not shown here. 
5.2. Immigration and emigration flows for men and women 
Data on gross flows by sex are available from 1958 onwards. We constructed 
four time series of data, i.e. two flows for each sex. Initially, we assumed that 
family migration and return migration should be reflected as lagged and 
unlagged cross-correlations between the four series. However, no systematic 
patterns could be discovered. The strongest meaningful cross-correlations were 
• Emigration in a certain year and immigration one to three years later: 
correlations of 0.7-0.8 for men, and 0.6-0.7 for women (migration connected 
to work and education between Norway and neighbouring countries). 
• Immigration of men and immigration of women one to three years later: 
correlations of between 0.75 and 0.85 (family reunification). 
Other cross-correlations were low (immigration followed by emigration; 
emigration of one sex followed by emigration of the other sex) or could not be 
given any meaningful interpretation. 
 
The unclear correlation patterns are explained by the fact that the character of 
migration to and from Norway has changed considerably over the past decades. 
Although migration to and from other countries in Western Europe and Northern 
America has always been a stable component in Norwegian migration flows, the 
remaining part of migration has been much more volatile. The 1960s and early 
1970s saw immigration of unskilled workers from less developed countries, 
particularly from Pakistan. During the second half of the 1970s and the first half of 
the 1980s, family reunification of these labour immigrants was important. It was 
also the time when the demand for skilled labour in the oil industry increased. The 
second half of the 1980s saw several short-term flows of refugees and asylum 
seekers, in particular from Iran and Chile (1987-1988) and Sri Lanka (since 1987). 
After 1987, immigration from less developed countries decreased steadily. The war 
in the former Yugoslavia led to many refugees and asylum seekers in 1993. The 
fact that the reasons for migration and countries of origin and destination changed 
rather frequently during the past 40 years means that a stable correlation pattern 
for the whole period is improbable. Obviously, migration data broken down by 
reason for migration (labour migration, family reunification, refugee) and country 
of origin or destination would probably reveal more stable correlation patterns, but 
such data are not available in sufficient detail (broken down by age and sex) for a 
long enough period. Note that Alho (1998), in his analysis of Finnish migration 
data for the period 1945-1995, found no clear cross-correlation between 
immigration and emigration either. 
 
We have assumed that immigration and emigration are independent. Given the 
weak empirical correlation between the two flows, this assumption means that 
the uncertainty in total net migration is a little too high in our simulations. The 
following models were estimated. 
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Table 5.1. Estimates of migration model parameters. Estimated standard errors in 
parentheses 
 Immigration  Emigration 
      
C 0.533 (0.361)  0.013 (0.016) 
φ 0.948 (0.037)  - - 
θ 0.304 (0.165)  - - 
ε 01 (0.095)  01 (0.099) 
1 Assumed value. 
 
 
(5.1) Immigration:  ln(it) = C + φ ln(it-1) + εt - θεt-1 
 
(5.2) Emigration:  ln(ut) = C + ln(ut-1) + εt 
 
Estimates are given in Table 5.1. 
 
Both for immigration and for emigration, the constant C was adjusted in such a 
way that predicted levels of it and ut corresponded to values assumed by 
Statistics Norway in its official population forecast.20 The two models were used 
for predicting total immigration and emigration for the period 1995-2050. Due 
to the rapid growth in the prediction intervals, it was decided to keep all 
predictions constant after five years, see Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
 
Predicted numbers of immigrations and emigrations for each year were broken 
down by sex on the basis of corresponding sex shares as observed on average for 
the period 1967-1997. For men the average shares were 51.3 per cent for 
immigration, and 51.0 per cent for emigration. Corresponding standard 
deviations were 1.99 and 1.74 per cent. In the late 1950s and in the first half of 
the 1960s, more women than men migrated to and from Norway each year. 
These women had relatively often Norwegian nationality, and travelled abroad 
for reasons of education. In the 1970s and later, labour migration, family 
reunification and refugees dominated the migration pattern, with a higher share 
of men than women. We assume that the latter pattern will continue. For each 
year and each flow, male and female shares were drawn on the basis of a 
binomial distribution (approximated by a normal distribution), with expected 
values and standard deviations as given above. 
                                                     
20 In the spirit of Appendix 4.1, one can show that for the ARMA(1,1)-process of expression (5.1), 
the following holds: ∑ −
=
− 


+−=
1l
0j
l
1995
1l
1995
l
1995
ˆˆˆˆZˆ)l(ZˆC φεφθφ , where Zt = ln(it), Z1995(l) is the  
l-step ahead 1995-based prediction of Zt,  and a hat denotes an observed or estimated value. In the 
calculation of C, l was chosen equal to five years. 
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Figure 5.1. Immigration, observed and predicted 
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Figure 5.2. Emigration, observed and predicted 
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5.3. Age patterns of immigration and emigration 
The age patterns of immigration and emigration for men and women have been 
treated in a similar manner. Below we will report the method used for 
immigration of men. 
 
Let im(x) denote the share of male immigration at age x in total male 
immigration in a certain year (the time index is suppressed here). The following 
double exponential model, which is due to A. Rogers and L. Castro (1986), has 
been assumed for the age pattern: 
 
 
)2x(2e)2x(2
2
x1
1
m eaea)x(i
µλµαα −−−−−− += , x=2, 3, …, 80 
 
The two terms model migration of young children (parameters a1 and α1) and of 
adults (parameters a2, α2, µ2, and λ2). Retirement migration, which is included as 
a third term in the Rogers-Castro (R-C) model, is hardly or not visible in the 
Norwegian data, and hence we ignored it. By omitting ages 0 and 1 from the 
estimation, we achieved a good fit for ages over 50. The way we treated ages 0 
and 1 is described below. We used non-linear weighted least squares regression 
to estimate the six parameters. In order to obtain a satisfactory fit for the prime 
migration ages, weights equal to 100 were used for ages 26 through 32, whereas 
weights for other ages were set to one.  
 
The six parameters have been estimated for the period 1967-1997, and a simple 
extrapolation method has been used to predict their values for the years until 
2050. Based on visual inspection, we decided to use exponential decline for 
decreasing parameters, and a constant pattern for parameters that showed no 
clear time trend. This generated predictions for im(x) for ages 2-80. Inspection of 
the age pattern for future years still revealed the typical bi-modal shape that 
characterizes migration, although the pattern was slightly different from that in 
recent years. Each share was adjusted proportionally, so as to ensure that the 
sum over all ages between 2 and 80 would be equal to 0.96, viz. the average sum 
in the base period. For ages x>80, we assumed that im(x)=0. For ages zero and 
one, we predicted the shares in the following way: 
 
 im(x,t) = im(2,t).im(x,1995)/im(2,1995),  x=0,1; t=1995, 1996, …, 2050. 
 
Thus shares at ages zero and one were assumed to grow or decrease with the 
same rate as that for age 2. A final proportional adjustment guaranteed that the 
shares for all ages 0-80 add up to one. 
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6. Prediction intervals for Norway's 
future population 
This chapter presents results of the 5 000 simulations for the cohort component 
model as described in the previous chapters. To summarize: the simulations were 
based on the following assumptions: 
• future expected values for the TFR, the life expectancy, and numbers of 
immigrants and emigrants are in conformity with the medium variant of 
Statistics Norway’s 1999-based population forecast; 
• prediction intervals for the TFR, the mean age at childbearing, the variance in 
that age, and the numbers of immigrants and emigrants have been restricted; 
• for each component of change, uncertainty in time series coefficients has been 
taken into account, in addition to residual variance. 
Because of the restrictions mentioned above, a total of approximately 8 000 
simulations had to be carried out, of which some 3 000 were rejected. The 
simulations covered the years 1996-2050. 
6.1. Total population 
Figure 6.1 shows prediction intervals for total population size. We have selected 
an expected forecast accuracy of 67 per cent (odds two against one), 80 per cent 
(odds four against one) and 95 per cent (odds 19 against one). Note how fast 
uncertainty increases when we look further into the future: the intervals widen 
rapidly. The odds are two against one that the Norwegian population will 
number between 3.9 and 6 million in 2050. Compared to the median forecast 
(50 per cent) of 4.8 million in 2050, this two-thirds prediction interval is 43 per 
cent wide. There is a clear trade-off between greater accuracy (larger odds) and 
higher precision (narrower intervals). For instance, odds of 19 against one (95 
per cent probability) produce an interval between 3.2 and 7.3 million in 2050. 
This interval is twice as wide as the 67 per cent interval: 88 per cent, compared 
to the median forecast.  
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Figure 6.1. Population size 
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Statistics Norway’s two most recent population forecasts have base years 1996 
(Statistics Norway 1997) and 1999 (Statistics Norway 1999). How do the results 
of those official forecasts compare to our stochastic simulations? The 1996 
forecast predicted between 4.3 and 6.0 million inhabitants in Norway in 2050. 
According to our simulations, the expected probability that this will be the case is 
less than 56 per cent. The expected accuracy of the high-low interval of the 
official forecast is somewhat larger in the first forecast years: 77 per cent in 
2000, and 66 per cent in 2010. The 1999 forecast had wider fertility margins 
than the previous one, and predicted between 4.2 and 6.3 million inhabitants in 
2050. This resulted in a slightly higher expected accuracy in 2050 (62 per cent). 
Thus, the expected accuracy of the official forecast is somewhat below two-thirds 
on the long run, and a little above that level on the short run. The same con-
clusion was reached earlier on the basis of an entirely different method, namely 
the extrapolation of observed forecast errors in old population forecasts 
(Statistics Norway 1994, 33).  
 
In case we would have assumed that time series coefficients for fertility, life 
expectancy, and numbers of immigrants and emigrants were given, instead of 
estimated, only residual variance would have been taken into account, and 
prediction intervals would have been narrower. A new set of 5 000 simulations 
with only residual variance resulted in a 95 per cent prediction interval for total 
population size in 2050 equal to (3.3, 7.2) million. The interval is 162 000 
persons narrower than the corresponding interval in Figure 6.1.  
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6.2. Age pyramids 
Figures 6.2-6.5 present age pyramids for the years 1996, 2010, 2030, and 2050. 
They show very clearly the age pattern of uncertainty: in an absolute sense, 
prediction intervals are wide for young age groups, and narrow for the elderly21. 
This reflects the fact that fertility and mortality have very different impact on the 
age structure, with international migration taking an intermediate position. Note 
also that the interval for the age group 0-4 widens rapidly between 2010 and 
2030, because most of the parents of the youngest age group in 2030 themselves 
were born during the forecast period, which increases uncertainty. As a result, 
intervals in 2030 under the age of 20 are so wide, that the forecast is not very 
informative. In 2050 this is the case for virtually all age groups, in particular 
when the intervals are judged in a relative sense (compared to the median 
forecast). 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Observed population by age and sex. 1996 
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21 Relative intervals, that is intervals as a ratio of the median forecast, show a different pattern, see 
below. 
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Figure 6.3. Simulated population. 20101 
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Figure 6.4. Simulated population. 20301 
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1 The solid line represents the median forecast. It is surrounded by (from inside to outside) the 67 per cent interval, the 
80 per cent interval, and the 95 per cent interval. 
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Figure 6.5. Simulated population. 20501 
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1 The solid line represents the median forecast. It is surrounded by (from inside to outside) the 67 per cent interval, the 
80 per cent interval, and the 95 per cent interval. 
 
Figure 6.6 illustrates how expected forecast errors propagate through the age 
structure. It gives the width of the two-thirds prediction interval for men in 
2010, 2030, and 2050, relative to the median forecast22. The figure demonstrates 
that relative uncertainty due to fertility is largest, even larger than that for the 
oldest old, caused by mortality. With increasing forecast duration, the 
uncertainty in age groups between 20 and 45, which is caused by international 
migration, drowns in fertility and mortality uncertainty.  
 
The values for birth cohorts 1950-1954 and 1990-1994 are marked. The latter 
men, who were born immediately before the forecast's base year, have lowest 
uncertainty among all cohorts in the forecast. Those who were born earlier are 
confronted with larger uncertainty due to international migration (for example 
birth cohort 1975-1980, who were aged 30-34 in 2010), or due to high mortality 
(for instance cohort 1950-1954). The interval for this latter cohort grows 
exponentially over the cohort's life course. Men who were born after 1996 have 
also relatively wide prediction intervals, due to uncertainty in fertility. Note, for 
example, men born in the years 2005-2009, who were aged 0-4 in 2010 and 40-
44 in 2050. 
                                                     
22 The pattern for women is similar, the largest differences occurring for elderly women. For 
instance, at age 95+, women have a relative 67 per cent prediction interval that is 0.27, 0.61, and 
0.97 per cent times the corresponding median value in 2010, 2030, and 2050. See also Figure 6.8 
for the year 2010. 
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Figure 6.6. Relative width of 67 per cent prediction interval. Men 
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6.3. Dependency ratios 
Ageing is certain, at least until around 2040. In that year, the odds are two 
against one that the old age dependency ratio (OADR), defined as the population 
6723 and over relative to that aged 20-66, will be between 0.33 and 0.43, i.e. at 
least 10 points higher than today's value of 0.23, see Figure 6.7. When we state 
that ageing is certain, that is because the probability of a ratio in 2040 which is 
lower than today's, is close to zero. 
 
Statistics Norway has assumed high and low trajectories both for future fertility, 
mortality, and net immigration. The combination of high fertility with high life 
expectancy (i.e. low mortality), and high immigration defines the so-called high 
population growth variant. The low population growth variant combines low 
fertility with low life expectancy and low immigration. Now consider the OADR 
in Statistics Norway’s official population forecast. We will use this variable to 
illustrate that the traditional way of computing high, medium and low variants in 
a deterministic cohort-component forecast gives a false impression of uncer-
tainty. In Chapter 1 we noted that the high-low intervals for the numerator and 
the denominator of the OADR in the official forecast constitute 31 per cent and 
32 per cent of the value according to the medium variant. At the same time, the 
OADR-range is only 1.3 per cent of the OADR-value in the medium variant. This  
                                                     
23 The legal retirement age in Norway is 67. 
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Figure 6.7. Old age dependency ratio 
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narrow interval suggests much less uncertainty for the OADR than a true 
stochastic forecast does. For instance, Figure 6.7 shows relative prediction 
intervals in 2050 equal to 38 (67 per cent), 49 (80 per cent), and 78 (95 per 
cent) per cent wide, compared to the median OADR forecast. The reason for too 
narrow intervals in the official forecast is that perfect correlation is assumed, 
both across components and over time. This unrealistic assumption implies that 
traditionally computed forecast variants cannot be given a statistical 
interpretation. 
 
The 95 per cent prediction interval for the OADR stretches from 0.255 to 0.540 
in 2050 - it is 0.285 wide. The corresponding interval that results when only 
residual variance is acknowledged, and time series coefficients are assumed 
given, is 0.257 wide.  
6.4. Comparison with historical errors in the age structure  
How do the prediction intervals around the age structure compare with empirical 
intervals computed on the basis of historical forecasts? We have assembled data 
on observed forecast errors in the age structure (five-year age groups, by sex) in 
the forecasts published by Statistics Norway with base years between 1969 and 
1985, extending Texmon’s database mentioned in Section 3.1.6. We have 
restricted ourselves to a forecast duration of 15 years. Forecast variants were  
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Figure 6.8. Relative width of 67 per cent interval. Forecast duration = 15 years 
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given equal weight. The forecast value for each age group was compared to its 
actual value, and the percentage error was computed.24 For each age group up to 
80-84 we had fifteen error values, for age group 85 and over 12. Errors were 
sorted by size, and bounds of the two-thirds empirical interval were obtained by 
interpolation, if necessary. Figure 6.8 plots the width of the two-thirds intervals 
for men and women, and compares these historical intervals with the simulated 
prediction intervals for the year 2010.  
 
There is rather close agreement between the historical pattern and the simulated 
one. In both cases, errors are high for young ages, and moderate for the elderly. 
Historical variation is relatively large for ages 0-9 and 80 and over. For the 
youngest age groups this is explained by the sharp fall in the TFR in the 1970s 
and the modest increase at the end of the 1980s. Historical variation is relatively 
large for the elderly because of the strong increase in survival chances since 
1970, in particular for women. In the simulated fertility and mortality 
trajectories up to 2010, such sudden developments are less likely (but not 
excluded). For ages 25-39, prediction intervals are wider than one would expect 
                                                     
24 For the forecasts with base years 1977 and 1979, not all results were published for five-year age 
groups. Deviant age groups were 0-6, 7-12, 13-15, 16-19, 60-63, 64-66, and 67-69. Forecast results 
for these age groups were transformed into five-year results by means of linear interpolation based 
upon observed population data for one-year age groups. 
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on the basis of historical forecast errors. This reflects the fact that the variation in 
year-to-year immigration has increased since the beginning of the 1990s, see 
Figure 5.1. It is unlikely that the smooth developments that were observed until 
the mid-1980s will repeat themselves in the period up to 2010.  
 
This empirical comparison suggests that prediction intervals for young and old 
ages are plausible, while the relatively wide intervals for the intermediate age 
groups can be justified. 
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7. The use of stochastic population 
forecasts 
Population forecasts in general are widely used in various planning situations, 
such as schooling, health care, and pension systems. In the short run, the 
uncertainty expressed by stochastic forecasts is relatively limited25, and a user 
who has a five-year planning horizon, say, may safely use a deterministic forecast 
computed in the traditional way. In such cases, the point forecast (expected 
value) is likely to be of more interest than the prediction intervals. But in the 
long run, the expected error in the forecast results becomes increasingly 
important, and planners who are interested in the age structure of the 
population 30 years or more into the future, should take uncertainty seriously. 
We shall give two examples, one from health care, and the other one from old 
age pensions. 
 
In a recent analysis of the future demand for hospital beds in Norway, the 
authors concluded that in 2050, the population will need between 2.7 and 4.0 
million person days in hospital annually (Paulsen et al., 1999). This implies an 
increase by 45-79 per cent compared with the current number of 1.9 million 
person days in hospital per year. The results were obtained on the basis of the 
low and the high population forecast of Statistics Norway, combined with certain 
assumptions regarding health parameters such as the mean duration of hospital 
stay for future patients, and the mean number of patients compared to the whole 
population. Many of these parameters are age-specific, and the increase in the 
demand for hospital beds in this analysis is entirely a consequence of population 
ageing (the authors assumed a slight decrease in the average duration in hospital 
per patient). The demand interval in 2050 is 1.3 million person days, or 38 per 
cent of the medium forecast. The majority of the patients is 65 years or older. 
For this age group, two-thirds prediction intervals increase sharply with age, 
from 21 per cent for the 65-69s, to 26-36 per cent for the 80-84s, and 65-78 per 
cent for the 90-94s, see Figure 6.6. This suggests that the accuracy of the 2.7-4.0 
                                                     
25 For some very specific forecast results, such as the number of centenarians, uncertainty may be 
considerable also on the short run. The same holds true for stochastic forecast results at a low 
regional level, for instance municipalities.  
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million forecast is probably lower than two-thirds, and the Paulsen et al. 
projection results should be treated with great caution26. Clearly, a fully 
stochastic forecast of the future demand for hospital beds should also take into 
account the fact that the relevant medical parameters are stochastic. The 
covariance structure of these parameters, and possible correlations with 
population variables has yet to be explored. 
 
Fredriksen (1998) describes a microsimulation model that is able to simulate, 
among others, future public pension benefits and contributions of the Norwegian 
population. Norwegian public pensions are of the "Pay as you go" (PAYG)-type. 
In one set of simulations starting in 1993, the author shows that the contribution 
rate will rise from 16 to 23 per cent in 2030. The simulations are based upon a 
number of demographic and non-demographic (labour market participation, 
disability, earnings, retirement) assumptions. Next he analyses the consequences 
for the contribution rate of various alternative assumptions. The rate turns out to 
be between 21 and 25 per cent in 2030, depending on high or low disability risks 
in the population, or high or low labour force participation among women. The 4 
percentage points difference implies a relative interval of 16 per cent of the 
reference value for the contribution rate. Because of the PAYG nature of the 
pensions, it is relevant to inspect the Old Age Dependency Ratio27. Then we see 
(Figure 6.7) that the OADR has a relative two-thirds prediction interval of 18 per 
cent in 2030 (the 80 per cent and 95 per cent intervals are 23 per cent and 35 
per cent  wide, respectively). This means that the bandwidth defined by possible 
policy options (denoted as “reasonable” by Fredriksen) is smaller than the 
uncertainty implied by the demographics alone. In other words, the effects of 
labour market changes and disability changes will likely drown in inherent 
population uncertainty at the horizon 203028.  
 
These two examples show how important it is to take population forecast 
uncertainty seriously. However, an often-heard objection is that projections of 
the kind mentioned here are purely conditional “what-if” calculations, and that it 
is unnecessary to consider expected forecast errors. “If the population would 
                                                     
26 For 2010 and 2030, the authors obtain intervals of 13 and 25 per cent of the medium forecast, 
respectively. Thus the general conclusion of low accuracy is not substantially altered on the short 
and medium term. 
27 In case fund based pension systems are considered, life course uncertainty of the type illustrated 
in Figure 6.6 would be relevant. 
28 Fredriksen investigates also “packages” of alternative assumptions. For instance, in an “ageing 
alternative” he combines low population growth with high disability risks. A “growth alternative” 
combines high population growth with low disability risks and high female labour force 
participation. The contribution rate varies between 16 and 30 per cent in 2030, when either of these 
packages is chosen. This implies a relative variation of 58 per cent, much larger than the prediction 
interval for the OADR. In this case the sensitivity analysis has clear policy relevance. One may 
object, however, that the implicit assumption of perfect correlation between the components (in the 
ageing alternative, each year when fertility is high, also disability risks are high, and mortality and 
immigration are low) is not very realistic. 
Norway's Uncertain Demographic Future Social and Economic Studies 105 
78 
show this or that trend, what would the consequences be for the health care 
system?” Any deviations from the assumed demographic path are not of primary 
importance. We do not agree with this objection. Since population size is, in 
practice, a continuous variable, the probability that the population will follow 
this or that trend, is zero. This reduces the policy relevance of many 
deterministic planning studies, unless one can demonstrate that demographic 
uncertainty is negligible. In all other cases one is forced to think in terms not of 
point forecasts, but of intervals - and intervals imply expected accuracy and 
statistical analyses. Therefore the traditional approach based on deterministic 
variant projections is inconsistent from a statistical point of view, as 
demonstrated by the intervals for the OADR in Section 6.3.  
 
The format in which stochastic population forecasts are made available to the 
users is very different from that employed for traditional deterministic forecasts. 
The latter type of results can be included in tables in printed reports. If results 
for one-year or five-year age groups are published, the user who is interested in a 
specific larger age group can find the corresponding number by simply adding 
the age-specific results. A stochastic forecast, however, is presented in the form 
of predictive distributions. Each forecast result has its own distribution. Thus, the 
bounds of the prediction interval of a larger age group are generally not equal to 
the sum of the bounds of the constituent ages. For instance, the lower and upper 
bounds of the 95 per cent interval of total population in 2050 are 3.20 and 7.29 
million, respectively, see Figure 6.1. On the other hand, the sums of the corre-
sponding bounds for men and women broken down in five-year age groups in 
Figure 6.5 are 2.77 and 8.00 million. The former interval [3.20, 7.29] is the 
correct one. It is narrower than the results obtained by simple addition, because 
the results for the various age groups are correlated. At time t, age groups x1 and 
x2 are correlated, for three reasons. First, births occurring in years (t-x1) and  
(t-x2) are correlated. The time series model for fertility in Chapter 3 takes 
account of the fact that when fertility is high in a certain year, it is also likely 
high the year thereafter. Although the correlation between calendar years that 
are further apart is weaker than the one-year correlation, it is not entirely zero. 
In other words, nearby age groups are strongly correlated, ages further apart 
only weakly. The second reason is related to the chances of survival for the two 
birth cohorts (t-x1) and (t-x2) until time t. These survival chances are correlated, 
again due to the time series character of the mortality model. Finally, immi-
gration for the two birth cohorts is correlated. Thus, when the prediction interval 
of two or more age groups is to be determined, correlation across ages should be 
taken into account. In traditional forecasts, one assumes perfect correlation 
across time for the components of change. For instance, in the high variant, 
fertility is high in the first forecast year, and it is also high in all the other years. 
Because of this perfect correlation, the sum of age-specific results for the high 
variant coincides with the high variant result for a sum of age groups, and 
similarly for the low variant. But equivalent high-low variants for age groups do 
not define bounds that have equal probability coverage, because the variants 
assume perfect correlation. In stochastic forecasts, the correlation is less than 
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perfect and simple addition of prediction bounds does not give the correct 
bounds for the aggregate. (Expected values may be added, of course.) 
 
The consequence is that stochastic forecasts should be made available to the user 
in the form of a database (Alho 1990), from which the user can construct the 
prediction intervals of any age group he is interested in. An example is the 
database of Statistics Netherlands, which can be accessed from the Internet, see 
http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/index_NL.stm.  
 
Finally, one should keep in mind that all the results presented here are computed 
on the basis of a number of linked stochastic models, with specific assumptions 
concerning the prediction intervals for future fertility, mortality, and migration. 
The expected values of the distributions coincide with those assumed by 
Statistics Norway in its official population forecast. But the intervals may be 
larger or smaller in other applications than the current one, depending on the 
particular models and assumptions used. 
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8. Conclusions 
The demographic future of any population is uncertain, but some of the many 
possible trajectories are more probable than others. Therefore, an exploration of 
the demographic future should include two elements: a range of possible 
outcomes, and a probability attached to that range. Together, these two 
constitute a prediction interval for the population variable concerned. This report 
gives the results of a research project of which the aim was to compute 
prediction intervals for the future population of Norway broken down by age and 
sex to the horizon 2050. 
 
Chapter 6 contains the main results. We estimate that the odds are four against 
one (80 per cent chance) that Norway’s population, now 4.5 million, will number 
between 4.3 and 5.4 million in the year 2025 and 3.7-6.3 million in 2050. This 
illustrates that uncertainty increases with time. There is a clear trade-off between 
greater accuracy (larger odds) and higher precision (narrower intervals). Odds of 
19 against one (95 per cent chance) result in a wider interval: 4.1-5.7 million in 
2025, and 3.2-7.3 million in 2050. The probabilistic population forecasts of the 
youngest and the oldest age groups show largest uncertainty, because fertility 
and mortality are hard to predict. As a result, prediction intervals in 2030 under 
the age of 20 are so wide, that the forecast is not very informative. In 2050 this is 
the case for virtually all age groups, in particular when the intervals are judged 
in a relative sense (compared to the median forecast). The expected accuracy of 
the total population size forecast published by Statistics Norway is somewhat 
below two-thirds on the long run, and a little above that level on the short run. 
 
Prediction intervals for different population variables cannot simply be combined 
to find the interval for an aggregated variable. For instance, the lower limit of 
the 67 per cent prediction interval for the total population in a certain future 
year is not equal to the sums of the corresponding lower limits for men and 
women. The reason is that predicted numbers of men and women are correlated, 
caused by the assumed correlation between male and female mortality, and that 
between male and female migration. The consequence is that each separate 
forecast result has its own prediction interval, which cannot be computed on the 
basis of intervals for more detailed results.  
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The results in Chapter 6 have been obtained on the basis of stochastic simulation 
of each of the three components of population change, viz. fertility, mortality, 
and international migration. Simulation of the components relied heavily on 
three complementary methods: 
• time series analysis for key demographic indicators, such as the TFR, the life 
expectancy, and numbers of immigrants and emigrants; 
• an analysis of historical forecast errors, assembled on the basis of forecasts 
produced by Statistics Norway since 1969; 
• and finally expert judgement, for instance to restrict the prediction interval for 
the TFR or that for the numbers of immigrants and emigrants to reasonable 
ranges. 
 
Much emphasis has been given in this study to time series analysis, because the 
underlying statistical model facilitates an appropriate treatment of forecast 
uncertainty. For fertility and migration, however, the time series resulted in 
unrealistically wide prediction intervals. This is the reason why the intervals had 
to be narrowed in a subjective manner. Historical forecast errors for the TFR, the 
life expectancy at birth, and the age structure for men and women have been 
used to check the plausibility of the prediction intervals’ width.   
 
The predictions for mortality and international migration were calibrated in such 
a way that the median coincided with the Medium Variant value of the 1999-
based official population forecast of Statistics Norway. Our time-series 
predictions for the TFR agreed closely with the official ones. 
 
The time-series predictions indicated that assumptions on future TFR as 
employed by Statistics Norway in its official population forecasts have estimated 
coverage probabilities of only 46, 31, and 24 per cent in the years 2010, 2030, 
and 2050. The official mortality assumptions have higher expected accuracy in 
2050 (just over 60 per cent for the life expectancy), but lower values in the 
beginning of this century (around 35 per cent in the period 2000-2010). 
 
The prediction intervals presented in this report have been computed on the 
basis of certain assumptions about the stochastic nature of fertility, mortality, 
and international migration. Although these assumptions appear reasonable, it is 
not at all certain that they are entirely correct. Different assumptions will lead to 
different prediction intervals. Thus the intervals should not be interpreted too 
strictly. Rather they indicate the order of magnitude of forecast uncertainty. 
Careful monitoring of the forecast results may provide an answer to the question 
whether the prediction intervals are correct. In case a significantly higher share 
than two-thirds of the observed population numbers lies inside the 67 per cent 
prediction intervals, this signals intervals that are too wide, and vice versa. 
 
The results apply to the national level only. Therefore the present approach 
ought to be extended.  Regional population forecasts should also be presented in 
the form of prediction intervals, but an appropriate methodology to compute 
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such regional intervals has yet to be developed. Two major problems have to be 
solved in regional stochastic population forecasting: first, to specify correct 
regional correlation structures for fertility, mortality and migration, and second, 
to specify a correct statistical model for interregional migration. 
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